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EITC for All:  A Universal Basic Income  
Compromise Proposal 
 
Benjamin M. Leff* 
Abstract 
Much has been written about a concept called universal basic 
income (UBI). With a UBI, the government gives every person a 
certain amount of money each year, or even each month. The UBI 
has broad appeal with thinkers on both the right and the left, but 
the appeal is partially because different thinkers have different 
visions of what the current state of affairs is with respect to 
government welfare policies and different theories about why these 
existing policies are inadequate or damaging. Reforming existing 
programs, rather than making a radical break with the past, could 
satisfy at least some of the interests that motivate support for a UBI. 
The purpose of this Article is to explore the possibility of modifying 
the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC), the largest and arguably 
most popular U.S. anti-poverty government transfer program, in 
order to capture at least some of the benefits associated with the 
UBI. This Article explores four problematic aspects of the EITC, 
each of which could be modified to make it function more like a UBI. 
These four aspects are: (1) the EITC creates disincentives to work 
for the so-called “nearly poor” because the credit phases out at 
moderately low income levels; (2) the EITC is fundamentally 
dependent on family structure, which is potentially unfair, 
invasive, and affects incentives to marry, divorce, and cohabitate; 
(3) receipt of the EITC benefit is temporally mismatched with 
recipient need, expensive for recipients to collect, and difficult for 
the IRS to administer because the EITC is integrated with the tax 
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system; and, finally, (4) the EITC is too small to fully function as a 
hedge against underemployment and poverty. Modifying the EITC 
would make it more like a UBI and would make it more effective at 
achieving the goal of supporting financially struggling workers and 
their families while minimizing perverse incentives.  
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I. Introduction 
Much has been written about a concept called universal basic 
income (UBI). The basic definition of UBI is “a regular cash 
income, paid to all, on an individual basis, without means test or 
work requirement.”1 In other words, the government gives every 
person some money every year, or even every month.2 UBI appeals 
to thinkers on the political left, the political right, and places in 
between.3 But, sometimes the broad appeal of UBI can be 
attributed to the fact that different thinkers envision different 
UBIs that solve different problems.4 That is partially because 
different thinkers have different visions of what the current state 
of affairs is with respect to government welfare policies and 
different theories about why these existing policies are inadequate 
or damaging.5 In fact, current income-support policies in the 
United States are a pastiche of approaches, all of which are 
simultaneously different from and similar to a UBI.6 Reforming 
                                                                                                     
 1. PHILIPPE VAN PARIJS & YANNICK VANDERBORGHT, BASIC INCOME:  A 
RADICAL PROPOSAL FOR A FREE SOCIETY AND SANE ECONOMY 1 (2017); see also 
SIMON BIRNBAUM, BASIC INCOME RECONSIDERED:  SOCIAL JUSTICE, LIBERALISM, AND 
THE DEMANDS OF EQUALITY 3 (2012) (providing an alternative definition of UBI as 
“an income unconditionally granted to all permanent members of society on an 
individual basis, without any means test or work requirement”). 
 2. See VAN PARIJS & VANDERBORGHT, supra note 1, at 1 (explaining the basic 
principle behind universal basic income).  
 3. See, e.g., Nathan Heller, Who Really Stands to Win from Universal Basic 
Income?, NEW YORKER, July 2, 2018, at 65–66 (“Guaranteed income, reconceived 
as basic income, is gaining support across the spectrum, from libertarians to labor 
leaders.”). 
 4. See, e.g., ANNIE LOWREY, GIVE PEOPLE MONEY:  THE SIMPLE IDEA TO SOLVE 
INEQUALITY AND REVOLUTIONIZE OUR LIVES 130 (2018) (“[T]here is a pernicious 
and nonsensical idea that a UBI would appeal to both sides, acting as a bipartisan 
means that could be used for bipartisan ends. The idea of a UBI might be 
bipartisan, but the ends and means would never end up pleasing both sides.”). 
 5. See VAN PARIJS & VANDERBORGHT, supra note 1, at 40–43 (explaining the 
EITC and the social welfare programs enacted alongside it and discussing the 
benefits and drawbacks). In the United States, the issue of different theories is 
exacerbated by the fact that much of the writing about UBI, scholarly and 
otherwise, is produced in countries with very different (and generally more 
robust) welfare policies. See VAN PARIJS & VANDERBORGHT, supra note 1, at 7–9 
(providing examples of European contributions to the idea of a universal basic 
income). 
 6. See VAN PARIJS & VANDERBORGHT, supra note 1, at 40–43 (comparing and 
contrasting EITC and UBI); see also LOWREY, supra note 4, at 184 (comparing the 
amount of money spent on various social welfare programs with the money that 
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existing programs, rather than making a radical break with the 
past, could satisfy at least some of the interests that motivate 
support for a UBI.7 The purpose of this Article is to explore the 
possibility of modifying the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC),8 the 
largest and arguably most popular U.S. anti-poverty government 
transfer program, in order to capture some of the benefits 
associated with a UBI.9 
The Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) is a U.S. federal 
income-support program that is politically popular.10 Proposals to 
expand the EITC have become more common in recent years.11 One 
former contender for the Democratic presidential nomination in 
2020, Senator Kamala Harris, had proposed a new tax credit that 
would function like a reformed EITC, even though it was described 
as a supplement to the existing EITC rather than a reform of it.12 
The EITC differs from a UBI in several respects, but as a broad 
federally funded program that provides financial support to 
low-income families and individuals, it also has many 
commonalities.13 This Article seeks to explore four problematic 
                                                                                                     
would be spend on a proposed UBI). 
 7. See LOWREY, supra note 4, at 7 (setting forth some of the benefits 
supporters of the UBI recognize). 
 8. See SARAH HALPERN-MEEKIN ET AL., IT’S NOT LIKE I’M POOR: HOW 
WORKING FAMILIES MAKE ENDS MEET IN A POST-WELFARE WORLD 24 (2015) (“The 
EITC was designed to bring a minimum-wage worker and his or her family above 
the official poverty line.”). 
 9. See VAN PARIJS & VANDERBORGHT, supra note 1, at 40–43 (explaining the 
history of the EITC and those it would benefit).  
 10. See HALPERN-MEEKIN ET AL., supra note 8, at 4 (“President Reagan 
proclaimed it ‘the best anti-poverty, the best pro-family, the best job creation 
measure to come out of Congress.’”). 
 11. See Gene B. Sperling, A Tax Proposal That Could Lift Millions Out of 
Poverty, THE ATLANTIC (Oct. 17, 2017), 
https://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2017/10/eitc-for-all/542898/ (last 
visited Oct. 23, 2019) (describing a Republican and Democratic consensus on 
expanding the EITC to serve childless workers) [https://perma.cc/7QUG-Z495]; 
see, e.g., Grow American Incomes Now Act, H.R. 3757, 115th Cong. (2017) 
(proposing an expansion of the EITC for working families). 
 12. See LIFT (Livable Incomes for Families Today) the Middle Class Act, S. 
3712, 115th Cong. (2018) (proposing a cash payment for low- and middle-income 
American households);  see also Press Release, Kamala D. Harris, Harris Proposes 
Bold Relief for Families Amid Rising Costs of Living (Oct. 18, 2018) (stating that 
the Act would “provide middle class and working families with a tax credit of up 
to $6000 a year—or up to $500 a month—to address the rising cost of living”). 
 13.  See Andrew Flowers, What Would Happen if We Just Gave People 
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aspects of the EITC, each of which could be modified to make it 
function more like a UBI, and I would argue, better.14 Those four 
aspects are:  (1) the EITC creates disincentives to work for the 
so-called “nearly poor” because the credit phases out at moderately 
low income levels; (2) the EITC is fundamentally dependent on 
                                                                                                     
Money, FIVETHIRTYEIGHT (Apr. 25, 2016), 
https://fivethirtyeight.com/features/universal-basic-income/ (last visited Oct. 23, 
2019) (“The original seed planted by [Milton] Friedman’s negative income tax idea 
eventually blossomed into the Earned Income Tax Credit.”) 
[https://perma.cc/2LJS-SCEV];  see also Dennis J. Ventry, Jr., The Collision of Tax 
and Welfare Politics:  The Political History of the Earned Income Tax Credit, in 
MAKING WORK PAY:  THE EARNED INCOME TAX CREDIT AND ITS IMPACT ON AMERICA’S 
FAMILIES 15 (Bruce D. Meyer & Douglas Holtz-Eakin eds., 2002) (describing the 
history of the EITC as a federal benefit for low-income working taxpayers); 
Dennis J. Ventry, Jr., Welfare by Any Other Name:  Tax Transfers and the EITC, 
56 AM. U. L. REV. 1261 (2007) (highlighting that qualification for EITC depends 
upon an individual’s tax returns). 
 14. See discussion infra Part V (exploring solutions to the identified 
problems of the EITC). Some versions of these problems (and others) have been 
discussed in the literature on improving the EITC. See Anne L. Alstott, The 
Earned Income Tax Credit and the Limitations of Tax-Based Welfare Reform, 108 
HARV. L. REV. 533 (1995) (discussing problematic aspects of the EITC); see also 
MAKING WORK PAY:  THE EARNED INCOME TAX CREDIT AND ITS IMPACT ON AMERICA’S 
FAMILIES 1 (Bruce D. Meyer & Douglas Holtz-Eakin, eds., 2002) (providing 
research which discusses the EITC and its “noncompliance and marriage 
penalties”);  Anne L. Alstott, Why the EITC Doesn’t Make Work Pay, 73 LAW & 
CONTEMP. PROBS. 285 (2010) (evaluating the significance and the history of the 
EITC);  Leslie Book et al., Insights from Behavioral Economic Can Improve 
Administration of the EITC, 37 VA. TAX REV. 177 (2018) (arguing for more 
taxpayer-centric policies to boost EITC compliance);  Daniel P. Gitterman et al., 
Expanding the EITC for Single Workers and Couples without Children:  Tax Relief 
for All Low-Wage Workers, 15 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POL’Y 245, 245–46 (2008) 
(“[E]xpansion of the EITC to childless single workers and married couples without 
children deserves greater attention.”);  Sara Sternberg Greene, The Broken Safety 
Net:  A Study of Earned Income Tax Credit Recipients and a Proposal for Repair, 
88 N.Y.U. L. REV. 515, 522–23 (2013) (describing how the once a year payment of 
the EITC does not provide adequate safety from financial shocks during the year); 
Francine J. Lipman & Dawn Davis, Heal The Suffering Children:  Fifty Years 
after the Declaration of War on Poverty, 34 B.C. J.L. & SOC. JUST. 311, 322 (2014) 
(“Child-related tax benefits have done much to relieve poverty, but they could be 
more effective.”); Francine J. Lipman, Access to Tax InJustice, 40 PEPP. L. REV. 
1173, 1186 (2013) (noting a number of the EITC’s “design challenges”); AM. 
ENTER. INST. FOR PUB. POL’Y RES. & BROOKINGS INST., OPPORTUNITY, 
RESPONSIBILITY, AND SECURITY:  A CONSENSUS PLAN FOR REDUCING POVERTY AND 
RESTORING THE AMERICAN DREAM 38 (2015) (arguing for removal of the child 
dependence requirement as a way to “improve employment among disconnected 
men”); STEVE HOLT, AM. ENTER. INST., THE ROLE OF THE IRS AS A SOCIAL BENEFIT 
ADMINISTRATOR 1 (2016) (offering “strategies to improve the IRS’s role as benefit 
administrator”);  
90 26 WASH. & LEE J. CIV. RTS. & SOC. JUST. 85 (2019) 
family structure, which is potentially unfair, invasive, and affects 
incentives to marry, divorce, and cohabitate; (3) receipt of the EITC 
benefit is temporally mismatched with recipient need, expensive 
for recipients to collect, and difficult for the IRS to administer 
because the EITC is integrated with the tax system; and, finally, 
(4) the EITC is too small to fully function as a hedge against 
underemployment and poverty.15 A reformed EITC that corrected 
these four problems would, in each instance, move the program 
closer to a UBI. It would also make the EITC program more 
effective at achieving the goal of supporting financially struggling 
workers and their families while minimizing perverse incentives. 
At the same time, an expanded and modified EITC would still 
bear one fundamental difference with a UBI:  No money would be 
provided unless a recipient works.16 I believe that a UBI without a 
work requirement is superior to a modified EITC, but I 
acknowledge that a significant barrier to political support for a 
UBI comes from discomfort with a comprehensive program that 
completely delinks income from work.17 That discomfort comes 
from several very real sources.18 First, the moral connection 
between income and work—while subject to numerous caveats—
runs deep in American culture.19 The idea that people who are able 
                                                                                                     
 15. See Lipman, supra note 14, at 1186 (identifying what she believes are 
the four most pressing remaining problems with the EITC: “(1) complexity; (2) 
high marginal tax rates in the EITC income phase-out ranges; (3) the marriage 
penalty; and (4) minimal benefits for childless low-income workers and workers 
outside of the age range and other statutory requirements”).  
 16. See VAN PARIJS & VANDERBORGHT, supra note 1 (defining the universal 
basic income as having no work requirement);  see also HALPERN-MEEKIN ET AL., 
supra note 8, at 24 (laying out that the EITC is supposed to help minimum-wage 
workers, necessarily requiring a work component).  
 17. See Heller, supra note 3, at 65 (observing that there is apprehension 
regarding the delinking of work and welfare).  
 18. See VAN PARIJS & VANDERBORGHT, supra note 1, at 99 (acknowledging 
that universal basic income goes against widely held views that “it is unfair for 
able-bodied people to live off the labor of others”) (quoting Jon Elster, Comment 
on Van der Veen and Van Parijs, 15 THEORY & SOC’Y 709, 719 (1986));  see also 
DAMON JONES & IOANA MARINESCU, THE LABOR MARKET IMPACTS OF UNIVERSAL 
AND PERMANENT CASH TRANSFERS:  EVIDENCE FROM THE ALASKA PERMANENT FUND 
(2018) (using the Alaska Permanent Fund as a method for studying the impact of 
a UBI on labor markets);  BIRNBAUM, supra note 1 (addressing the philosophical 
issues by a basic income that in effect de-couples work from income). 
 19. See VAN PARIJS & VANDERBORGHT, supra note 1, at 99 (acknowledging 
that universal basic income goes against widely held views that “it is unfair for 
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to work and support themselves would choose to stay home while 
other workers are compelled by the state to support them seems 
manifestly unjust to many, even to many philosophers.20 Second, 
good empirical evidence about the effects of a substantial UBI on 
labor participation rates is rare (although there are many current 
projects seeking to gather good data).21 Observers may have 
legitimate concerns that a UBI would create incentives for 
low-income workers to stay home.22 
A true UBI demands a delinking of income and labor.23 But, 
because of significant popular and political opposition to this 
delinking, it is worthwhile to explore mechanisms for getting at 
least some of the benefits of a UBI without having to try to convince 
skeptics of its most radical feature. Envisioning a modification of 
the existing EITC to make it more like a UBI is at least one way to 
do that. 
This Article proceeds in four parts. First, I introduce the UBI. 
Second, I explain how the current EITC works and introduce some 
criticism of it. Third, I describe similarities between the EITC and 
a UBI. And, fourth, I describe four proposed reforms of the EITC 
to make it function more like a UBI and discuss some of the 
trade-offs involved in substituting an expanded EITC for a full UBI 
program. 
                                                                                                     
able-bodied people to live off the labor of others”) (quoting Jon Elster, Comment 
on Van der Veen and Van Parijs, 15 THEORY & SOC’Y 709, 719 (1986)). 
 20. See VAN PARIJS & VANDERBORGHT, supra note 1, at 9 (acknowledging that 
universal basic income goes against widely held views that “it is unfair for 
able-bodied people to live off the labor of others”) (quoting Jon Elster, Comment 
on Van der Veen and Van Parijs, 15 THEORY AND SOC’Y 709, 719 (1986)); see also 
BIRNBAUM, supra note 1 (addressing the philosophical issues by a basic income 
that in effect decouples work from income); STUART WHITE, THE CIVIC MINIMUM:  
ON THE RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS OF ECONOMIC CITIZENSHIP 3 (2003) (analyzing 
the justness of a market economy under certain obligations related to economic 
citizenship); Miranda Perry Fleischer & Daniel Hemel, Atlas Nods:  The 
Libertarian Case for Basic Income, 2017 WIS. L. REV. 1189, 1203–34 (providing 
philosophical analysis and justification of a UBI). 
 21. See JONES & MARINESCU, supra note 18, at 2 (using the Alaska 
Permanent Fund as a method for studying the impact of a UBI on labor markets). 
 22. See, e.g., VAN PARIJS & VANDERBORGHT, supra note 1, at 99 (laying out 
the two main concerns that most opponents of the UBI express).  
 23. See VAN PARIJS & VANDERBORGHT, supra note 1, at 1 (explaining that 
universal basic income does not require a work requirement, therefore delinking 
it from income and labor).  
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II. Universal Basic Income (“UBI”) 
A universal basic income (“UBI”) is an old idea that has 
recently seen increased attention and popularity around the 
world.24 A simple definition of a UBI is that it is “a regular cash 
income, paid to all, on an individual basis, without means test or 
work requirement.”25 Not included in the definition, but important 
nonetheless, is the idea that a basic income, at least one that is not 
merely transitional, should be sufficient to make a significant 
difference in the lives of poor recipients.26 Ideally, it should provide 
at least a subsistence living to everyone in society.27 In effect, a 
UBI is a fixed amount of cash that is paid to each member of society 
regularly throughout the year, whether they work or not, and 
whether they are poor or not.28 While the idea of a UBI seems 
simple, it is often presented as a radical departure from current 
governmental transfer programs, especially in a place like the 
United States that is perceived to have a relatively restrictive 
social safety net.29 In some ways, it is indeed both simple and 
radical. But, each of the components of its definition is both more 
complicated and less radical the more they are examined. I break 
the UBI down into five primary components in this Section:  (i) A 
UBI has no work requirement;  (ii) a UBI is not “means tested”;  
(iii) a UBI is paid on an individual basis;  (iv) a UBI is a cash 
payment made at regular intervals throughout the year;  and (v) a 
UBI is large enough to make a significant difference in the lives of 
the poor. This Article argues that the largest transfer program in 
the United States, the EITC, could be modified to incorporate four 
                                                                                                     
 24. See, e.g., Heller, supra note 3, at 66 (“Recently, a resurrection has 
occurred.”). 
 25. VAN PARIJS & VANDERBORGHT, supra note 1, at 1. 
 26. See Heller, supra note 3, at 65 (“In the U.S., its supporters generally 
propose a figure somewhere around a thousand dollars a month: enough to live 
on—somewhere in America, at least—but not nearly enough to live on well.”). 
 27. See Heller, supra note 3, at 65 (explaining what basic income should 
consist of). 
 28. See Heller, supra note 3, at 65 (“A universal basic income, or U.B.I., is a 
fixed income that every adult—rich or poor, working or idle—automatically 
receives from government.”). 
 29. See VAN PARIJS & VANDERBORGHT, supra note 1, at 170–71 (providing poll 
data from the United States indicating strong opposition to government welfare). 
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of these five elements. The very first component—the lack of work 
requirement—is not proposed. 
A. A UBI Has No Work Requirement 
For many, the most radical definitional component of a UBI is 
that, unlike most other social welfare transfer programs, it does 
not distinguish between recipients based on their ability or 
willingness to work.30 That is to say, it is provided on an equal 
basis to recipients whether they work or not, even if non-work is a 
choice.31 Most other forms of social welfare in the United States 
(and elsewhere) at least attempt to particularize aid to specific 
categories of “deserving” recipients.32 For example, the social 
security system in the United States illustrates some of the ways 
social welfare is often categorized.33 There are programs for the 
elderly,34 the disabled,35 the temporarily unemployed,36 and the 
spouses and children of deceased workers.37 In many cases, receipt 
of benefits is conditional on a history of labor participation and 
payment of social security taxes.38 Additional social programs are 
largely directed at children, since children are inherently 
                                                                                                     
 30. See VAN PARIJS & VANDERBORGHT, supra note 1, at 99 (acknowledging 
that universal basic income goes against widely held views that “it is unfair for 
able-bodied people to live off the labor of others”) (quoting Jon Elster, Comment 
on Van der Veen and Van Parijs, 15 THEORY & SOC’Y 709, 719 (1986)). 
 31. See Heller, supra note 3, at 65 (“A universal basic income, or U.B.I., is a 
fixed income that every adult—rich or poor, working or idle—automatically 
receives from government.”). 
 32. See John Kay, The Basics of Basic Income, 52 INTERECONOMICS 69, 69 
(2017) (noting that “[a]ll established tax and benefit systems make use of both 
contingent and income-related information” and providing examples). 
 33. See SOC. SEC. ADMIN., SECTION 218 TRAINING:  INTRODUCTION TO SOCIAL 
SECURITY, https://www.ssa.gov/section218training/basic_course_3.htm (last 
visited Oct. 23, 2019) (listing the social welfare programs that fall under the social 
security program) [https://perma.cc/TA7H-9S7F]. 
 34. See id. (listing retirement insurance as social security program). 
 35. See id. (listing disability insurance as a social security program). 
 36. See id. (listing unemployment insurance as a social security program). 
 37. See id. (listing survivors’ insurance as a social security program). 
 38. See id. (“Your work in Social Security covered employment helps you and 
your family qualify for [social security] benefits. The benefit amounts are based 
on the earnings reported to the Social Security Administration.”). 
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“deserving” (and not expected to work), although their parents may 
or may not be.39  
Obviously, this impulse to separate “deserving” from 
“undeserving” poor is, and has always been, fraught because of 
social conceptions of inclusion and exclusion shaped by race and 
other factors.40 For most non-elderly adults, whether they have 
children or not, the most basic way U.S. social welfare policy has 
distinguished between deserving and undeserving poor is to 
attempt to assess potential recipients’ willingness to work.41 
However, it is administratively complicated to assess an 
individual’s willingness to work, since the question is necessarily 
particular.42 Therefore, the biggest transfer program in the United 
States, the EITC, uses a very simple metric to assess willingness 
to work:  The credit is calculated as a percentage of earned 
income.43 If a potential recipient is unable to work in the market 
economy, then she is denied all benefit. If she works, the benefit is 
phased in based on how much she earns. The more she earns, up 
to a ceiling, the more she gets. This simple metric obviously fails 
to provide benefits to potential recipients who are unable to work, 
either because they cannot find any paid job or because of disability 
or other “legitimate” reason, but its strength is its administrative 
simplicity.44 A UBI, on the other hand, eschews all attempts to 
                                                                                                     
 39. See id. (listing family and child welfare services as a social security 
program). 
 40. See, e.g., LOWREY, supra note 4, at 138 (“Large swaths of the American 
safety net and wealth-building programs were designed to exclude, punish, and 
discipline the descendants of the country’s slaves.”) 
 41. See 45 C.F.R. § 261 (2019) (explaining the Temporary Assistance for 
Needy Families Program—what used to be called “welfare”—has an elaborate 
work requirement). 
 42. See id. (discussing the administrative steps that must be taken to 
determine willingness to work). 
 43. See discussion infra Part III (“[T]he amount of credit received by very 
low-income workers is entirely dependent on how much they earn. As they earn 
money, they are eligible for the credit as a percentage of money earned, up to an 
amount of income at which they are receiving the maximum credit.”). 
 44. A recent popular book is testament to the perceived importance of a work 
requirement to gain popular and political support for a transfer program. Chris 
Hughes, a founder of Facebook, argues passionately for what is in some respects 
a universal basic income. But in his version, a recipient must show some kind of 
work, either paid labor or certain kinds of unpaid non-market labor. See CHRIS 
HUGHES, FAIR SHOT: RETHINKING INEQUALITY AND HOW WE EARN 94 (2018) 
(discussing the work requirement). 
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differentiate between recipients who need aid because they cannot 
work and recipients who simply choose not to work. 
In this Article, I make no attempt to resolve the fairness, 
incentives, or administrability arguments about the value of a 
work requirement.45 Instead, I present a universal transfer 
program that maintains a work requirement—in other words, one 
that is not a UBI. I do this simply to avoid one set of difficult issues 
that accompany any discussion of a true UBI. I believe these 
discussions are valuable and should not be avoided forever, but the 
purpose of this Article is to propose a program that does not rise or 
fall on the issue of willingness to work. 
B.  A UBI Has No Means Test 
The second key aspect of a UBI is that it is not 
“means-tested.”46 That means that no one is denied the transfer 
because of their income or wealth. 
 It is sent out to all recipients on an equal basis.47 This feature 
is often misunderstood, but it is arguably supported by arguments 
about fairness, incentives, and, perhaps most importantly, 
administrative simplicity. A UBI is often distinguished from 
existing transfer programs by arguing that existing transfer 
programs, because of means-testing, create what is sometimes 
called a “poverty trap.”48 Often, traditional means-tested transfer 
programs are described as follows:  (i) Benefits are only available 
to recipients whose income is below a certain threshold; (ii) once 
the threshold is exceeded, the recipient ceases to qualify for the 
                                                                                                     
 45. See discussion infra Part V (setting forth proposals to make the EITC 
more like a UBI and notably not discussing the arguments surrounding the work 
requirement).  
 46. See VAN PARIJS & VANDERBORGHT, supra note 1, at 8 (stating that the 
UBI is not based upon the wealth or income of those seeking the transfer). But 
see discussion infra note 211 (pointing out that some UBI advocates, like Karl 
Widerquist and Charles Murray propose UBI plans with phase-outs, apparently 
not viewing a phase-out of benefits as inconsistent with the definition of a UBI).  
 47. See VAN PARIJS & VANDERBORGHT, supra note 1, at 14 (describing how a 
basic income is paid in cash and unconditional in payment to each individual “at 
a level independent of that individual’s household situation”).   
 48. See, e.g., VAN PARIJS & VANDERBORGHT, supra note 1, at 7 (“People are 
entitled to continuing handouts on the condition that they remain destitute, and 
can prove it is involuntary.”). 
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transfer; (iii) therefore, means-testing creates a strong 
disincentive for a potential recipient to climb out of poverty by 
earning money, because earnings can disqualify the recipient for 
the transfer.49 In its most extreme form, means-testing creates a 
“cliff” effect, removing eligibility for transfers as soon as income 
exceeds some fixed level.50 Almost as extreme as a cliff is a “soak 
up” program, in which every dollar earned over the threshold 
amount results in a loss of a dollar of benefit.51 
While some traditional means-tested transfer programs may 
have been designed that way at some point in time, very few still 
are.52 Instead, eligibility for benefits generally phases out as 
income rises.53 In a “phase-out” program, the quantity of transfer 
for which a recipient is eligible decreases as income increases, 
eventually reaching a point at which the recipient is no longer 
eligible for any transfer.54 This phase-out structure still creates a 
disincentive to earn whenever the recipient’s income places them 
                                                                                                     
 49. See VAN PARIJS & VANDERBORGHT, supra note 1, at 7 (describing the ways 
in which a means-tested transfer can assist in creating a poverty trap for those 
seeking to utilize the transfer). 
 50. See Van PARIJS & VANDERBORGHT, supra note 1, at 18 (pointing out that 
a means-tested transfer creates a line for which eligibility can be drawn ensuring 
that those above a fixed level can no longer use the transfer). 
 51. See VAN PARIJS & VANDERBORGHT, supra note 1, at 19 (discussing the 
implications of imposing a marginal tax rate of 100% on any income earned by 
the poor, resulting in a poverty trap where one unit of benefit is retracted with 
every unit earned); see also BIRNBAUM, supra note 1, at 12 (explaining that a 
poverty trap is when “income support is reduced with the full amount of an 
increase in one’s labor income”). 
 52. See GENE FALK, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R43634, TEMPORARY ASSISTANCE 
FOR NEEDY FAMILIES (TANF): ELIGIBILITY AND BENEFIT AMOUNTS IN STATE TANF 
CASH ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS 3–5 (2015) (explaining that the only significant 
means-tested program in the United States is Temporary Assistance for Needy 
Families (TANF), which has different eligibility rules for each state). 
 53. See Daniel N. Shaviro, Effective Marginal Tax Rates on Low-Income 
Households, 84 TAX NOTES 1191, 1192–99 (1999) (discussing how a phase-out 
system operates with regards to the income of those seeking the transfer). 
 54. See id. at 1191–92 (describing how a phase-out benefit correlated to an 
income increase results in an “identical incentive and distributional effect” as 
imposing a positive marginal income tax rate explicitly); see also ANNIE MILLER, 
A BASIC INCOME HANDBOOK 81 (2017) (describing how phase-out ranges can often 
effectively disincentivize people from utilizing them because of the ways in which 
the earning disincentives can overlap). The U.K. recently tried to mitigate the 
problem of multiple overlapping phase-outs by creating a Universal Credit, which 
is reduced by a “Marginal Deduction Rate” (phase-out) of 65 or 76 percent, 
depending on the income of the recipient. Id.  
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in the “phase-out range.” When multiple benefit programs have 
uncoordinated overlapping phase-out ranges, the earnings 
disincentive can get very large, even potentially exceeding 100%. 
That means that earning a dollar under such circumstances would 
result in the worker losing more than a dollar in benefits, in that 
case, it seems that the earnings disincentive is real and dramatic.55 
However, much more often, phase-outs are more gradual,56 and the 
incentive effect might be small. There is empirical uncertainty 
about how the disincentive works at lower levels of income.57 When 
phase-outs strongly affect incentives for low-income workers, they 
are said to create a “poverty trap” (just as a cliff or soak-up would) 
by discouraging workers from earning enough to climb out of 
poverty.58 
An ideal UBI solves this problem by removing the phase-out 
of benefits, making the benefit available to all.59 For some, 
removing means testing seems inefficient or unfair.60 Why should 
the government give money to people who earn enough on their 
own and do not need government assistance? After all, to the 
degree to which the purpose of government transfer programs is to 
assist the poor, targeting benefits at the poor seems like the most 
                                                                                                     
 55. See MALCOLM TORRY, MONEY FOR EVERYONE: WHY WE NEED A CITIZEN’S 
INCOME xi (Bristol Univ. Press 2013) (explaining how marginal deduction rates 
impact additional earnings);  see also Guy Standing, Forward to MALCOLM TORRY, 
MONEY FOR EVERYONE: WHY WE NEED A CITIZEN’S INCOME, at xxii (Bristol Univ. 
Press 2013) (arguing means tests and behavior tests cannot overcome poverty 
traps “whereby the precariat often pay a marginal tax rate of over 80 percent, 
twice what the ‘middle class’ is expected to pay . . . [and] many end up paying 
more than 100 per cent ‘tax’ on income gained in some precarious short-term 
job.”).  
 56. See id. at 157 (explaining that many phase-outs are not as large of a 
disincentive as they can be laid out to be and are rather much less drastic). 
 57. See discussion infra accompanying notes 218–223 (discussing the income 
disincentives that can come with certain transfer programs especially for those in 
lower income brackets). 
 58. See Alstott, Why the EITC Doesn’t Make Work Pay, supra note 14, at 549 
(“For workers in the EITC phase-out range, the EITC creates an unambiguous 
potential work disincentive.”). 
 59. See VAN PARIJS & VANDERBORGHT, supra note 1, at 28 (discussing the 
ways basic income can help our economy and create “a way of living that is 
sustainably generalizable.”).   
 60. See MILLER, supra note 54, at 81 (discussing how removing means testing 
can create disincentives that make it less likely for people to take advantage of 
the transfer credit). 
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efficient policy. The answer is that a UBI is available to all to avoid 
the disincentives associated with phasing it out. Many UBI 
supporters also argue that a non-means-tested benefit is good 
politically because it avoids distinguishing between low-income 
people (who need assistance) and middle- and higher-income 
people.61  
As an added complication, it is often pointed out that it is 
inappropriate to think about a UBI outside the context of any tax 
used to fund it.62 Wherever there is an income tax, there is a 
governmentally created disincentive to earn income. If income is 
taxed at 10%, for example, the marginal benefit of earning a dollar 
is reduced by 10%. This disincentive functions the way a phase-out 
of a benefit program functions. There is the potential for confusion 
in the terminology used to describe the difference between a phase-
out and a general income tax, like the one described above. In the 
example above, what distinguishes a phase-out and a tax is the 
fact that the phase-out ceases affecting income once the benefit has 
been entirely lost, while the tax continues as income grows. But it 
is important to emphasize the similarity between the two. Both 
function as a “marginal tax rate” on income:  In the case of the 
phase-out, the marginal tax rate is increased only when income is 
within the phase-out range;  in the case of the general tax, the 
marginal tax rate is presumably increased consistently on all 
income.63 Therefore, a phase-out increases the marginal tax rate 
for relatively lower-income people, while the general tax increases 
the marginal tax rate for higher-income people as well. A flat tax 
combined with a basic income (usually called a demogrant in the 
economic and tax literature) is “progressive” (and can be 
dramatically so).64  
                                                                                                     
 61. See, e.g., MILLER, supra note 54, at 79 (“[U]niversality means that 
everyone is included, and by avoiding the division created by targeting, it could 
lead to a more united, inclusive and harmonious society.”). 
 62. See VAN PARIJS & VANDERBORGHT, supra note 1, at 133 (discussing how a 
personal income tax is the more straightforward tax to fulfill this obligation of 
funding for universal basic income).  
 63. See Shaviro, supra note 53, at 1191 (defining “marginal tax rate” to be a 
structure “which results from layering multiple income-conditioned transfer 
phase-outs on top of various income-related taxes”).   
 64. See Ari Glogower & Clint Wallace, Shades of Basic Income 8–9 (N.Y.U. 
70th Annual Conference on Labor; Ohio State Pub. Law Working Paper No. 443, 
2017), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3122146 (explaining 
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Regressivity—which is when the marginal tax rate decreases 
for higher-income taxpayers—is generally perceived to be unfair 
and might create bad incentives.65 It might create bad incentives 
because higher marginal rates among lower-earning people under 
certain circumstances might create stronger disincentives for such 
people to work than those that apply to higher-earning people, 
creating unnecessary barriers to them working their way out of 
poverty or near poverty. Thus, UBI supporters argue that a UBI—
even one funded exclusively by a flat or relatively flat income tax—
is both fairer and more efficient than a means-tested transfer 
program, even in an otherwise moderately progressive income tax 
system.66 Although the real lesson is that the fairness or efficiency 
of means-testing can only be evaluated in the context of the 
structure of the system that funds such a program.67 
If a “surtax” was used to fund a UBI (or reformed EITC) and 
to recapture benefits from recipients as their income rises, that 
would be similar (or could be identical) to the UBI “phasing out,” 
the traditional structure by which benefits are lost as income 
rises.68 One potential difference between a “phase-out” and a 
“surtax” relates to how each function is administered. On one 
hand, if a benefits program operates outside of a taxing system, it 
must have its own administrative system to administer it. This 
administrative system must have the capacity to timely and 
accurately collect information about each applicant’s income. On 
the other hand, if a benefit program is universal, but the value of 
the benefit is recaptured through a surtax, only the tax 
                                                                                                     
the effect of a cash grant on the progressivity of an income tax) 
[https://perma.cc/9SZV-A6F3]. 
 65. But see Walter J. Blum & Harry Kalven, Jr., The Uneasy Case for 
Progressive Taxation, 19 U. CHI. L. REV. 417 (1952) (questioning whether an 
income tax should be progressive as a way to achieve fairness). 
 66. See Glogower & Wallace, supra note 64, at 8–9 (illustrating how a basic 
income grant is more progressive than an exemption for taxpayers). 
 67. See Daniel J. Hemel & Miranda Perry Fleischer, The Architecture of a 
Basic Income, 86 UNIV. CHI. L. REV. (forthcoming 2019) (manuscript at 8–9), 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3346467 (describing the 
interactions between a UBI phase-out and a progressive income tax) 
[https://perma.cc/U324-HM5F]. 
 68. See id. (manuscript at 8) (“[S]ome of the distinctions drawn between 
different UBI variants—for example a UBI with a phase-out and a UBI that never 
phases out—turn out to be alternative ways of accounting for the same flow of 
funds.”). 
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administration needs to collect that information (which, 
presumably, it must do anyway). A surtax is therefore an 
administrative simplification over a phase-out. To the degree in 
which a benefit recipient could receive the benefit but fail to pay 
the surtax owed (through fraud, error, or failure of the tax 
administration), a surtax system might increase costs and result 
in unfairness. The administrative distinction between a surtax 
system and a phase-out system should not be ignored, nor confused 
with the conceptual differences described above. 
C.  A UBI Is Paid on an Individual Basis 
A third key aspect of a UBI is that it is provided on an 
“individual” basis, as opposed to many traditional transfer 
programs where benefits depend on aspects of family status.69 
First, in traditional benefits programs, marital status often affects 
benefits, with married couples receiving less per capita than 
unmarried individuals.70 Second, many programs provide more to 
custodial parents of minor children than to recipients who do not 
have custody of children.71 Each of these family-status conditions 
creates complexity in the administration of the program, and 
potentially creates unfairness and perverse incentives. 
There is a strong justification for the 
family-structure-conditional design of traditional transfer 
programs. With respect to recipients who are “coupled,” it is argued 
that a subsistence level of income is higher for people who live 
alone than for people who share income with another adult because 
of so-called household economies of scale.72 Attempts to identify an 
                                                                                                     
 69. See VAN PARIJS & VANDERBORGHT, supra note 1, at 14–16 (explaining that 
a basic income is “individual” by definition). 
 70. See U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., 2019 POVERTY GUIDELINES 
(2019), https://aspe.hhs.gov/2019-poverty-guidelines (last visited Oct. 23, 2019) 
[hereinafter 2019 POVERTY GUIDELINES] (noting that in 2019 the poverty line for 
a single person household was $12,490, but it was only $16,910 for a two-person 
household) [https://perma.cc/3EXZ-AT3G]. 
 71. See, e.g., FALK, supra note 52, at 1–2 (explaining that TANF is one of 
several government benefits provided to poor families with children). 
 72. See Julie A. Nelson, Household Economies of Scale in 
Consumption: Theory and Evidence, 56 ECONOMETRICA 1301, 1301–02 (1988) 
(“[T]he notion that . . . the cost per person of maintaining a given material 
standard of living may fall as household size rises, often arises in the literature 
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official “poverty line” generally recognize this fact, with the poverty 
line for a two-adult household being lower per person than the 
poverty line for a single adult.73 To the degree to which a couple 
with a $20,000 annual income shares expenses, they are effectively 
“richer” than a person living alone with $10,000 annual income.74 
Therefore, if the goal of a transfer program is to provide each 
recipient with a comparable minimum standard of living, then 
giving less per person to couples who share expenses makes sense. 
But, of course, problems start immediately.75 First, a system 
is needed to establish a way of identifying those people who share 
expenses. In many programs, marriage is used as a proxy, which 
is obviously problematic since unmarried persons sometimes 
cohabitate and share expenses, and married persons sometimes do 
not. Using a proxy that is both over and under inclusive creates 
unfairness for those persons “misidentified” by the proxy. Perhaps 
more importantly, reducing benefits for individuals who get 
married may create disincentives to marry (or incentives to 
divorce), which is often called a “marriage penalty.”76 Imagine that 
two unmarried persons could cohabitate and share expenses, and 
each get the full $10,000 benefit (because they are unmarried). If 
they would receive a smaller per-person benefit if they married, 
they have an incentive not to wed. A UBI avoids the perverse 
incentives and potential unfairness of traditional transfer 
                                                                                                     
on household composition.”). 
 73. See 2019 POVERTY GUIDELINES, supra note 70 (noting that the poverty 
guidelines are sometimes loosely referred to as the “federal poverty level” (FPL), 
“but that phrase is ambiguous and should be avoided, especially in situations 
(e.g., legislative or administrative) where precision is important”). 
 74. See Nelson, supra note 72, at 1312 (“The variation in the sizes of the 
estimated effects across goods suggests that economies of scale are very important 
in the consumption of shelter, and substantially less important in the 
consumption of clothing and transportation.”). 
 75. See VAN PARIJS & VANDERBORGHT, supra note 1, at 14–16 (analyzing the 
different problems associated with providing basic income based on family 
structure).   
 76. See The Tax Policy Center Briefing Book: A Citizens’ Guide to the Tax 
System and Tax Policy Tax Policy, TAX POL’Y CTR., 
https://www.taxpolicycenter.org/briefing-book/what-are-marriage-penalties-and-
bonuses (last visited Oct. 23, 2019) (“A couple incurs a marriage penalty if the two 
pay more income tax filing as a married couple than they would pay if they were 
single and filed as individuals.”) [https://perma.cc/G8ST-5UCF]. 
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payments, but at the cost of failing to take into account potential 
savings from cohabitation.77 
With respect to treatment of custodial children, the 
justification comes from the observation that—if income is held 
steady—a person who supports children is effectively “poorer” than 
a person who does not. That follows from the simple observation 
that children cost money.78 But again, conditioning the receipt of 
transfers on the custody of children creates some administration 
problems, incentive problems, and arguably fairness issues. Most 
UBI supporters argue that the additional cost of children should 
be addressed by granting each child his or her own UBI (though 
one smaller than an adult) to reflect the marginal cost of raising a 
child (and to affirm the personhood of children).79 In this case, the 
only administrative issue is deciding which adult(s) should receive 
the child’s UBI payment to spend on the child’s behalf. 
 
D.  A UBI Is a Regular Cash Income 
 
Finally, a definitional criterion of a UBI is that it is “regular.”80 
It can be paid every month or every week, but it should not be paid 
as a lump sum at the end of the year, and it should not be paid only 
once over a person’s life.81 The benefit of a regular payment is that 
it can support a person through periods of unemployment or 
underemployment without a savings requirement—that is, even if 
a person fails to save for periods of low income, the UBI will be 
available to at least provide for his or her subsistence. 
                                                                                                     
 77. See, e.g., MILLER, supra note 54, at 68 (criticizing UBI schemes “because 
individual assessment means that couples will receive twice as much as a 
singleton, when they could manage on less than that”). 
 78. See Jacob Goldin & Zachary Liscow, Beyond Head of Household: 
Rethinking Taxation of Single Parents, 71 TAX L. REV. 367, 391 (2018)(“[C]hildren 
cost money to raise, including feeding, housing, and child care . . . .”).  
 79. See Should a Basic Income be Paid to Children?, BASIC INCOME EARTH 
NETWORK https://basicincome.org/basic-income/faq/#children (last visited Oct. 23, 
2019) (discussing a UBI for children) [https://perma.cc/7W63-BVCF].  
 80. See Robert C. Guth, Never Say Never: Ambitious State Tax Reform 
Proposals to Watch in 2018, 27 J. MULTISTATE TAX’N & INCENTIVES 24, 46 n.31 
(2018) (defining universal basic income as “income paid by a government, at a 
uniform level and at regular intervals, to each adult member of society”).   
 81. See generally ANNE ALSTOTT & BRUCE ACKERMAN, THE STAKEHOLDER 
SOCIETY (2000) (providing an example of a single-payment system). 
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In addition to being regular, a UBI is provided in cash, not “in 
kind.”82 Some welfare programs, like Supplemental Nutrition 
Assistance Program (food stamps),83 are provided “in kind,” out of 
a concern that cash may be misused by its recipients or engender 
fraud.84 A UBI is provided in cash under the assumption that 
people are generally the best equipped to determine their own 
needs, and therefore should be trusted with cash.85 Some argue 
that recognizing recipients’ capacities to make their own choices 
has dignitary value whether or not they maximize their benefits.86 
Cash is less expensive to administer than “in kind” benefits, so—
all else being equal—a cash benefit should be preferred.87 Insisting 
that a UBI should be delivered in cash does not mean that it cannot 
be delivered in an electronic form that is the equivalent of cash. 
The UBI could be loaded onto debit cards, for example, or in any 
other technologically appropriate mechanism.88 
                                                                                                     
 82. See About Basic Income, BASIC INCOME EARTH NETWORK, 
https://basicincome.org/basic-income/ (last visited Oct. 23, 2019) (“Cash payment:  
It is paid in an appropriate medium of exchange, allowing those who receive it to 
decide what they spend it on.”) [https://perma.cc/YEX8-YNLJ]. 
 83. Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP), U.S. DEP’T OF 
AGRIC. (2019), https://www.fns.usda.gov/snap/supplemental-nutrition-assistance-
program-snap (last visited Oct. 23. 2019) [https://perma.cc/KB5S-SDLN].  
 84. See How FNS Fights SNAP Fraud, Waste, and Abuse, U.S. DEP’T OF 
AGRIC. (2019), https://www.fns.usda.gov/snap/fraud (last visited Oct. 23, 2019) 
(detailing SNAP’s fraud policies) [https://perma.cc/6MFN-GVGR].  
 85. See, e.g., VAN PARIJS & VANDERBORGHT, supra note 1, at 13 (arguing that 
cash is superior to in-kind transfers as a means of “achieving greater freedom for 
all”). 
 86. See Fleischer & Hemel, supra note 20, at 1234 (explaining why cash 
transfers enhance “autonomy and self-ownership”).  
 87. See Michelle Miley, What Is the Difference Between Cash Transfers & 
In-Kind Benefits?, THE NEST,  https://budgeting.thenest.com/difference-between-
cash-transfers-inkind-benefits-22791.html (last visited Oct. 23, 2019) (noting that 
when a government agency distributes food to the hungry, it expends time and 
money, which “cash transfers don’t require”) [https://perma.cc/D9AG-3VHH]. 
 88. See, e.g., What Is Electronic Benefits Transfer (EBT)?, U.S. DEP’T OF 
AGRIC. (July 13, 2018), https://www.fns.usda.gov/snap/ebt (last visited Oct. 23, 
2019) (“Electronic Benefits Transfer (EBT) is an electronic system that allows a 
recipient to authorize transfer of their government benefits from a federal account 
to a retailer account to pay for products received.”) [https://perma.cc/L99G-HV6Z]. 
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E.  A UBI Is Large Enough to Have a Substantial Effect on the 
Lives of the Poor 
The final criterion is not always stated by UBI advocates (and 
may not be universally accepted), but is nonetheless important to 
most conceptions of a UBI: It should be large enough that it does 
not leave many people in poverty.89 Even though UBI advocates 
have very different conceptions of what problems a UBI should be 
designed to solve, very few of them would be satisfied with a UBI 
that left a substantial portion of the population in poverty.90 
Therefore, a UBI must be more substantial than current social 
welfare and transfer programs. 
III. The Earned Income Tax Credit 
The Earned Income Tax Credit (“EITC”) is the largest 
anti-poverty program in the United States, delivering $65 billion 
in cash to low-income families.91 It is a “refundable” tax credit, 
which means that it is integrated into the federal income tax 
system, with applicants seeking the credit by submitting a tax 
form with a special schedule attached, and the credit first being 
used to decrease any income tax due, and then if any of the credit 
remains, providing it to the applicant.92 The “refundable” nature of 
the credit means that for many very low-income people, the EITC 
is a net payment to the recipient from the federal government over 
                                                                                                     
 89. See, e.g., MILLER, supra note 54, at 23 (stating that “an excellent 
definition of a full Basic Income” is its “emphasis on universal, individual, 
unconditional and high enough for the individual to live a life of dignity with the 
opportunity to participate in public life”). 
 90. See Fleischer & Hemel, supra note 20, at 1259 (describing that, at 
minimum, UBI should cover “food, clothing, shelter,” and possibly basic 
healthcare).   
 91. See HOLT, supra note 14, at 1 (stating that that the EITC is the federal 
government’s “largest—and most successful—antipoverty programs” delivering 
65 billion dollars to 27 million eligible workers and families). 
 92. See Policy Basics:  The Earned Income Tax Credit, CTR. ON BUDGET & 
POL’Y PRIORITIES (2019), https://www.cbpp.org/research/federal-tax/policy-basics-
the-child-tax-credit (last visited Dec. 16, 2019) [hereinafter Policy Basics] (“The 
amount of EITC depends on a recipient’s income, marital status, and number of 
children.”) [https://perma.cc/9U5R-M5AV]. 
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and above any federal income taxes the recipient paid.93 Because 
it often functions as a payment from the government, rather than 
a reduction in income taxes due, it is a “transfer” program. The 
EITC has five characteristics that are most important for our 
current purposes:  (i) It is phased in (which makes it 
“work-conditional”);  (ii) it is phased out (which makes it 
“means-tested”);  (iii) it is provided based on family status, 
especially based on custody of minor children;  (iv) it is delivered 
through the tax system;  and (v) it is insufficient to raise all 
recipients out of poverty.94  
A.  The EITC Is Work-Conditioned 
First, the EITC is “phased-in,” which means that the amount 
of credit received by very low-income workers is entirely dependent 
on how much they earn—if they earn nothing, they get nothing.95 
As  workers earn money, they are eligible for the credit as a 
percentage of money earned, up to an amount of income at which 
they are receiving the maximum credit.96 For example, a worker 
with three or more qualifying children receives a credit equal to 
45% of earnings from the first dollar earned up to $14,290 of 
earnings.97 If she earns $14,290, her credit is 45% of that amount, 
which is $6431—the maximum credit.98 If she earns any less than 
that, she gets a smaller credit. If she were to work twenty hours 
per week for fifty weeks of the year doing a minimum wage job 
($7.25 per hour), she would earn $7250, and so her credit would 
                                                                                                     
 93. See id. (describing the implication of the “refundable” nature of the EITC 
program). 
 94. See id. (describing five important aspects of the EITC program). 
 95. See id. (“As the EITC phases in, it is calculated at a set percentage of 
earnings called the ‘phase-in rate,’ which depends on marital status and number 
of children.”). 
 96. See id. (noting that the EITC is designed to encourage and reward work, 
and incentivize people to leave welfare for work and for low-wage workers to 
increase their work hours). 
 97. See Rev. Proc. 2018-18, 2018-10 I.R.B. § 3.05 (2018), 
https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-irbs/irb18-10.pdf (last visited Oct. 23, 2019) 
(announcing inflation adjusted numbers for 2018 tax returns, including EITC 
Earned Income Amounts) [https://perma.cc/E9AJ-2424]. 
 98. Id.   
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only be $3262.50 (45% of her earnings in the phase-in range).99 
Because of this “phase-in” structure, the EITC is work-conditioned, 
but unlike other work-conditioned transfer programs, the EITC 
only takes into account paid work.100 No credit is given either for 
seeking work in good faith or for any kind of unpaid labor, whether 
it is for one’s family or in the volunteer sector.101 Similarly, no 
credit is given for people who are unable to earn, because of 
disability or age, for example. 
B.  The EITC Is Means-Tested 
Second, the EITC is “phased-out,” which means that the credit 
is lost as a percentage of income after a worker reaches a certain 
level of earned income (the “Income Eligibility Ceiling”).102 An 
unmarried worker with three qualifying children starts losing the 
credit when her income exceeds $18,660.103 After that, for each 
dollar she earns, she loses 21.06 cents of credit.104 When she has 
earned $49,194, she has completely lost the credit.105 This phase-
out is the way that the EITC is “means tested,” and it makes any 
potential recipient who earns more than $54,884 ineligible to 
receive any credit.106 For most taxpayers, the credit is unavailable 
                                                                                                     
 99. Id. 
 100. See Policy Basics, supra note 92 (“As the EITC phases in, it is calculated 
at a set percentage of earnings called the ‘phase-in rate,’ which depends on 
marital status and number of children.”). 
 101. See, e.g., HUGHES, supra note 44, at 169 (proposing that anyone who has 
a dependent under six or over 70-years-old should qualify for the benefit, since 
they are doing unpaid household labor).  
 102. See Policy Basics, supra note 92 (“[T]he point where the EITC phase-out 
begins, a household’s EITC amount decreases by a set percentage of income (the 
‘phase-out rate’) until the EITC is reduced to zero, where the phase-out ends.”). 
 103. See Rev. Proc. 2018-18, 2018-10 I.R.B. 395 (2018), 
https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-irbs/irb18-10.pdf (last visited Dec. 16, 2019) (showing 
the same threshold amount for unmarried workers with one or two qualifying 
children) [https://perma.cc/E9AJ-2424]. 
 104. See id. (dividing the maximum amount of credit by the difference 
between the threshold phase-out amount and the completed phase-out amount). 
 105. See id.  (multiplying .2106 by $6431 and adding the threshold phase-out 
amount of $18,660).  
 106. See id. (noting that the maximum income at which any taxpayer is 
eligible for any credit is $54,884, which is the Income Eligibility Ceiling for a 
married couple with three or more children). 
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at much lower levels of income.107 For example, once a childless 
person earns $15,270, he or she receives no credit.108 Taxpayers’ 
assets do not impact their eligibility for the EITC directly, but any 
income from savings can have a dramatic effect. Rather than 
phase-out the credit as investment income rises, there is a cliff at 
$3500.109 Taxpayers whose investment income exceeds $3500 do 
not qualify for the credit, no matter how much or little earned 
income they have.110 If one’s investment income is below $3500, it 
does not affect the calculation of the credit. As is discussed above, 
this phase-out creates an additional effective marginal tax rate, 
arguably creating a disincentive to earn additional income in the 
phase-out range, just as the phase-in creates a negative marginal 
tax rate (so to speak), increasing incentives to earn market income 
in the phase-in range. 
C.  The EITC Is Based on Family Status (Not Individual) 
Third, the EITC is expressly tied to family status, which 
produces some complications around marriage and child 
custody.111 First, even for couples without children, there is a 
marriage penalty associated with the structure of the benefit. 
Under certain circumstances, the aggregate benefit received by 
two married people is smaller than the benefit received if they are 
unmarried.112 For parents of a single child, the marriage penalty is 
more dramatic:  If one parent earns enough to lose all or some of 
                                                                                                     
 107. See id. (basing availability of credit on income levels for 2018 tax year). 
 108. See id. (providing information for 2018 tax year). 
 109. See id. (stating that the earned income tax credit is not allowed for 
taxpayers who have investment income that exceeds $3500). This 
investment-income cliff creates a strong disincentive to save enough in 
income-producing investments to reach that limit. See Hemel & Fleischer, supra 
note 67 (manuscript at 56) (pointing out that the 2018 EITC cliff relating to 
investment income cliff of $3500 could create a marginal tax rate of 60,000% on 
the 3,501st dollar of investment income). 
 110. Rev. Proc. 2018-18, 2018-10 I.R.B. 395 (2018), 
https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-irbs/irb18-10.pdf (last visited Dec. 16, 2019) 
[https://perma.cc/E9AJ-2424]. 
 111. See Policy Basics, supra note 92 (“The amount of EITC depends on a 
recipient’s income, marital status, and number of children.”). 
 112. See Policy Basics, supra note 92 (comparing the phase-out rates for those 
filing earned income taxes individually versus those married and filing jointly). 
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the credit, then marriage disqualifies the other parent from 
benefits as well, even if the other parent is the sole caregiver of a 
child.113 If the parents are separated and file under “married filing 
separately” status, then neither parent can claim the credit no 
matter how little or much they earn, since that status disqualifies 
parents from the EITC entirely.114 Second, because the benefit is 
so much larger for the custodial parent of children, the structure 
disincentivizes marriage for parents of multiple children, 
especially for parents who have more than two children.115 The 
increase in benefits with the first child is slightly larger than the 
marginal increase with a second child, and much higher than the 
marginal increase of adding a third child.116 After a parent has 
three children, there is no additional benefit.117 This structure 
creates an incentive for parents of multiple children to remain 
unmarried and each claim at least one child.118 A married couple 
with four children who each earn $18,000, for example, would 
receive a credit of $3976.119 If that same couple were unmarried, 
and each parent claimed two children, they would each receive a 
                                                                                                     
 113. See Caleb Smith & Michelle Lyon Drumbl, Understanding the Earned 
Income Tax Credit, in EFFECTIVELY REPRESENTING YOUR CLIENT BEFORE THE IRS 
§ 27.1.2.4 (Keith Fogg ed., 7th ed. 2018) (explaining how the marriage penalty is 
more severe for some low-income married couples). 
 114. See id. (explaining the EITC implications of having a “married filing 
separately” status). 
 115. See I.R.C. § 32(c)(3)(A)(2018) (noting the special rule for divorced or 
separated parents wherein a noncustodial parent can only claim deductions for 
qualifying children under § 151 and a child tax credit);  see also Smith & Drumbl, 
supra note 113, § 27.2.3.2 (“[T]he custodial parent is able to use the qualifying 
child for purposes of Head of Household filing status, EITC and the dependent 
care credit . . . [while] [t]he non-custodial parent is able to use the qualifying child 
for the dependency exemption and child tax credit.”). 
 116. See § 32(b)(1) (listing the tax credit percentages attributable to the 
number of qualifying children). 
 117. See id. (applying tax credits to a max of 3 or more qualifying children).  
 118. See Smith & Drumbl, supra note 113, § 27.2.2.4 (“Absent divorce or legal 
separation, . . . taxpayer[s] must file married filing separate (and [are] therefore 
ineligible for the EITC) unless they are ‘considered unmarried’ under section 
7703.”). 
 119. See Rev. Proc. 2018-18, 2018-10 I.R.B. § 3.05 (2018), 
https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-irbs/irb18-10.pdf (last visited Dec. 16, 2019) 
(providing inflation-adjusted EITC amounts for 2018, from which one could 
calculate that a married couple who earns $36,000 in the aggregate, earns the 
maximum credit of $6431, but puts $11,650 of their income into the phase-out 
range, reducing their credit by 2,453) [https://perma.cc/E9AJ-2424].  
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credit of $5716, and between the two of them, they would receive 
an aggregate credit of $11,432. In other words, because the couple 
is married, they receive $7454 less credit than they would receive 
if they were unmarried. This is true even if they cohabitate. These 
and other family-structure issues create potentially perverse 
incentives around marriage and cohabitation. 
The EITC is structured so almost no benefit (never more than 
a refund of a worker’s payroll tax obligation) goes to people who 
are not the custodial parent of at least one child.120 Because almost 
all other safety net programs are available to families with 
children or the elderly or disabled, childless workers and parents 
without primary care responsibility may fall through a hole in the 
safety net.121 Non-custodial parents of children may still have very 
real child support obligations, just like custodial parents, but no 
ability to meet them because they do not qualify for 
income-support programs.122  
In addition to disincentivizing marriage and failing to serve 
taxpayers who are non-custodial parents, basing EITC benefits on 
family structure also complicates filing and enforcement. While 
the IRS allows cohabitating unmarried parents to choose which 
parent claims the child,123 this is not the case with parents who do 
not cohabitate for at least half of the year.124 In other words, only 
the parent who lives with the child for over half the year can claim 
                                                                                                     
 120. See Policy Basics, supra note 92 (“In contrast to the EITC for families 
with children, the EITC for workers not raising children in the home remains 
extremely small—too small even to fully offset federal taxes for workers at the 
poverty line.”).  
 121. See Gitterman et al., supra note 14, at 249 (“[Single workers] are 
generally ineligible for means-tested cash and medical assistance . . . such 
assistance is limited to families with children, the elderly, and those with 
disabilities”). 
 122. See Gitterman et al., supra note 14, at 249 (“Very low-wage, 
non-custodial parents may find it difficult to meet their child support obligations 
and survive economically, which can further marginalize their attachment to 
legitimate work and to their children’s economic and psychological well-being.”). 
 123. See INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, PUB. NO. 596, 
EARNED INCOME CREDIT (EIC) 14 (2017), https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-
prior/p596--2017.pdf (noting the tax treatment of children by unmarried parents 
in examples ten and eleven) [https://perma.cc/JD3G-BDJM]. 
 124. See id. at 11 (requiring that a “qualifying child” live with you in the home 
for more than half the year).  
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the child for EITC purposes.125 This rule is further complicated by 
the fact that parents who live apart are permitted to choose which 
one claims a child for the purposes of the “dependency exemption,” 
and the custodial parent files a form with the IRS to “release” the 
child’s dependency exemption to the other parent. But this 
“release” is not only ineffective for the purposes of the EITC, it is 
often used by the IRS as evidence that the noncustodial parent 
does not qualify for the EITC because they fail the residency 
requirement.126 Taxpayers must be able to prove, and the IRS must 
be able to assess, where a child actually lives for over half the 
year.127 When parents share custody of a child or the child’s living 
situation changes during the year, evidentiary problems can 
prevent eligible taxpayers from receiving the credit.128 Further, the 
very definition of a qualifying child is not consistent across various 
tax provisions.129 In conclusion, the fact that administration of the 
EITC is linked to family status and directed towards custodial 
parents of children creates perverse incentives, limits the reach of 
the EITC, and creates administrative and enforcement burdens. 
D. The EITC Is Paid in a Lump Sum as a Tax Refund 
Fourth, the EITC is integrated into the federal income tax 
administrative system, which has implications about how it is 
claimed and delivered. Filing a return is complicated, and so 
claimants often hire paid preparers to help them file a return and 
claim the refund.130 Compared to the way traditional welfare 
                                                                                                     
 125. See I.R.C. § 32(c)(3)(C) (2018) (stating that the child must have lived with 
the taxpayer in the United States for over half a year). 
 126. See Smith & Drumbl, supra note 113, at 12–13 (explaining how the IRS 
uses the release for EITC purposes). 
 127. See IRM Exhibit 4.19.14-1 (providing a list of examples of acceptable 
documentation for EITC claims, such as proof of citizenship and relationship 
status). 
 128. See Smith & Drumbl, supra note 113, at 12–13 (“In close cases the 
practitioner is forced to count the days, which apart from substantiation and 
memory issues, is further complicated by the treatment of temporary absences.”). 
 129. See generally U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-17-558, FEDERAL 
LOW-INCOME PROGRAMS: ELIGIBILITY AND BENEFITS DIFFER FOR SELECTED 
PROGRAMS DUE TO COMPLEX AND VARIED RULES (2017) [hereinafter GAO-17-558] 
(describing various low-income program eligibility requirements).  
 130. See, e.g., Leslie Book, Bureaucratic Oppression and the Tax System, 69 
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benefits are usually claimed, this method shifts some of the cost of 
receiving the benefit onto the claimant;  however, some believe it 
reduces stigma and makes claiming the benefit easier.131 
Participation in the program among eligible claimants is estimated 
to be significantly higher than among traditional welfare 
programs.132 The most important fact about the way the refund is 
delivered is that it is paid in a single lump sum several months 
after the relevant year ends; therefore, it is not available to pay 
bills at the time that it is most needed.133 
E.  The EITC Is Too Small to Eradicate Poverty 
Finally, the EITC is too limited in amount.134 The maximum 
credit that any family can receive under current law (2018) is 
$6431 total for the year, for a taxpayer with three children.135 For 
a childless taxpayer, the maximum credit in 2018 is $519 for the 
year (less than $45 per month).136 In other words, compared to 
other transfer programs, the credit is substantial for recipients 
with children but is comparatively small for childless recipients (or 
recipients who do not meet the qualifications for the credit).137 In 
                                                                                                     
TAX LAW. 576, 576–77 (2016) (describing the administrative difficulties associated 
with claiming the EITC); see also HOLT, supra note 14, at 4 (highlighting four of 
the significant challenges associated with claiming the EITC). 
 131. See HALPERN-MEEKIN ET AL., supra note 8, at 193 (arguing that receiving 
the EITC through the tax system reduces stigma).  
 132. See Book, supra note 130, at 572 (discussing the high participation rate 
for the EITC). 
 133. See HOLT, supra note 14, at 4 (noting “[a] timing mismatch between when 
benefits are needed in EITC-qualifying households and when they are made 
available”);  see also discussion infra Part IV.C (describing the debate between 
scholars as to the advantages and disadvantages of the lump sum payment).  
 134. See Sharon Parrott, Commentary: The EITC Works Very Well—But It’s 
Not a Safety Net by Itself, CTR. ON BUDGET & POL’Y PRIORITIES (Mar. 26, 2014), 
https://www.cbpp.org/sites/default/files/atoms/files/3-26-14tax-commentary.pdf 
(last visited Dec. 16, 2019) (noting that the EITC itself is not enough income 
assistance to keep people out of deep poverty) [https://perma.cc/6D9Q-FA9Q]. 
 135. See Rev. Proc. 2018-18, 2018-10 I.R.B. § 3.05 (2018), 
https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-irbs/irb18-10.pdf (last visited Dec. 16, 2019) 
(providing inflation-adjusted EITC maximum credit amounts for families who 
have multiple children) [https://perma.cc/E9AJ-2424]. 
 136. Id. 
 137. See, e.g., Gitterman et al., supra note 14, at 258 (comparing maximum 
benefit amounts for recipients with no qualifying children, one qualifying child, 
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fact, the credit for childless workers is expressly tied to payroll 
taxes, refunding the half of payroll taxes that are paid by employed 
persons.138 If a person is self-employed (or a contractor), she is 
responsible for both halves of her payroll tax obligation so that the 
EITC will never do more than refund half of the payroll taxes she 
owes.139 As a result, for workers without custody of minor children, 
the EITC functions as a small tax refund, not a transfer 
program.140 
Because the EITC is so much more substantial for recipients 
with children, it really functions much more like a supplement to 
the child tax credit, providing tax relief and transfers to parents.141 
But even as a transfer program for recipients with children, the 
credit leaves many families in poverty.142 Even with the maximum 
credit for a family with three children ($6431 in 2018),143 this 
amount is not enough to bring a family out of poverty ($25,750 for 
a family of four)—even when added to the wage a parent would 
earn if working minimum wage ($7.25) for 2000 hours ($14,500).144 
F.  Illustrative Examples 
To illustrate these five components of the EITC program, it 
might be useful to think about two families, the Smiths and the 
Joneses. The Smiths consist of Ashley Smith and her three 
                                                                                                     
and two or more qualifying children).  
 138. See I.R.C. § 32(b)(1) (2018) (noting that the credit percentage for 
taxpayers with no qualifying children is 7.65%). 
 139. See id. (describing the applicability of the EITC to non-custodial 
parents). 
 140. See, e.g., Gitterman et al., supra note 14, at 247 (“Currently, there is only 
a small EITC for single workers between the ages of 25 and 64 who are not raising 
children.”).    
 141. See I.R.C. §§ 24(a), 24(h)(2) (2018) (stating that a credit of $2000 per child 
is available to workers in a broad range of incomes). 
 142. See Alstott, Why the EITC Doesn’t Make Work Pay, supra note 14, at 300 
(concluding that the EITC still leaves many families in poverty).  
 143. See Rev. Proc. 2018-18, 2018-10 I.R.B. § 3.05 (2018), 
https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-irbs/irb18-10.pdf (stating the EITC maximum 
amount for a family with three children) [https://perma.cc/E9AJ-2424]. 
 144. See 2019 POVERTY GUIDELINES, supra note 70 (detailing the number of 
persons in a family or household and the corresponding poverty level that would 
qualify the household for subsidies and benefits).  
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children, Sophia (9), Ethan (7), and Emma (5). The Joneses, alas, 
consists solely of Ms. Smith’s ex-husband, Michael Jones. 
The impact of the EITC on Mr. Jones is unlikely to be large. 
He is eligible for almost eight cents for every dollar he earns up to 
$6780.145 If he has a minimum-wage job, he will earn this amount 
once he works 935 hours over the course of the year, which 
qualifies him for the maximum credit of $519.146 Unfortunately, if 
he is an employee for all those hours, he will owe that amount in 
payroll taxes, which will be withheld from his paychecks by his 
employer(s).147 If he is self-employed, or employed as a contractor 
rather than an employee, he will owe twice the amount of the credit 
as self-employment taxes.148 So, the credit will only have the effect 
of offsetting or partially offsetting his federal tax obligations, even 
at the lowest levels of income.  
Once he manages to work 1171 hours at minimum wage, the 
credit will start acting as a disincentive to work. At the federal 
minimum wage of $7.25, Mr. Jones will earn $8490 when he works 
1171 hours—the EITC for a worker with no qualifying children 
begins to phase out at $8490 (in 2018).149 For every dollar he earns 
now, almost eight cents of credit will be lost. That loss of credit 
compounds his payroll tax or self-employment tax obligations, so 
that he will lose almost twenty-three cents for every dollar he 
earns, even before calculating any federal (or state) income tax 
that he might owe. Mr. Jones’s payroll taxes will be withheld 
throughout the year (or if he is self-employed, he will be required 
to make estimated payments periodically), but his EITC payment 
                                                                                                     
 145. See Rev. Proc. 2018-18, 2018-10 I.R.B. § 3.05 (providing 
inflation-adjusted EITC amounts for an unmarried individual who does not have 
custody of children). 
 146. See id. (providing the earned income credit and phase-out amount for 
eligible individuals). 
 147. See I.R.C. § 3101 (2018) (stating the payroll tax rate); see also id. § 3102 
(stating that employers are required to collect payroll taxes on behalf of 
employees);  id. § 32(b)(1) (stating that the EITC rate for taxpayers with no 
children is 7.65%). 
 148. See id. § 1401 (stating the self-employment tax rate); see also id. 
§ 32(b)(1) (stating the EITC rate for taxpayers with no children is 7.65%). 
 149. See Rev. Proc. 2018-18, 2018-10 I.R.B. § 3.05 (2018), 
https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-irbs/irb18-10.pdf (last visited Dec. 16, 2019) 
(announcing EITC Phase-Out Thresholds for 2018) [https://perma.cc/E9AJ-2424].  
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will be made in one lump sum in the first half of the year following 
the year he qualifies for it.150 
If Mr. Jones is like the majority of other claimants, he will 
have to hire someone to do his tax returns to claim the credit and 
will likely pay them for this service.151 He might even pay extra to 
receive a refund-anticipation loan, and his net EITC payment will 
then be even smaller.152 Because Mr. Jones is not the custodial 
parent of his children, he will not receive any EITC on their 
account, but he may still have an obligation to pay child support to 
his former spouse. Financial support obligations are not part of the 
EITC calculus and an unmarried person without custodial children 
is treated the same as an unmarried person with no children to 
support at all. 153 
For Ms. Smith, the credit operates differently and will 
probably have a bigger impact on her than on Mr. Jones. If she 
doesn’t manage to find any paid work in 2018, the EITC will not 
help her at all.154 But if she can find paid work, the EITC will pay 
her forty-five cents for every dollar she earns up to $14,290, 
subsidizing the first 1971 hours of work at minimum wage; her 
phase-out would not begin until she earns $18,660 (2574 hours at 
minimum wage).155 The subsidy will not be enough to bring her 
family out of poverty until her market earnings are substantial, 
                                                                                                     
 150. See infra Part IV.C (describing the debate between scholars as to the 
advantages and disadvantages of the lump sum payment). 
 151. See HOLT, supra note 14, at 5 (“A majority of EITC filers use commercial 
for-profit tax preparers, and these can be expensive.”).  
 152. See Brett Theodos et al., Urban Inst. Characteristics of Users of Refund 
Anticipation Loans and Refund Anticipation Checks, U.S. DEP’T OF TREAS., 1, 3 
(2010) https://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/financial-
education/Documents/Characteristics%20of%20Users%20of%20Refund%20Antic
ipation%20Loans%20and%20Refund%20Anticipation%20Checks.pdf (last visited 
Dec. 16, 2019) (detailing that refund anticipation loans are bank made loans that 
allow taxpayers to receive advances on their tax refunds from the IRS) 
[https://perma.cc/MXG7-YYU4]. 
 153. See Policy Basics, supra note 92 (“Under current law, a childless adult or 
noncustodial parent working full-time, year-round at the federal minimum wage 
is ineligible for the EITC.”).  
 154. See I.R.C. § 32(a)(1) (2018) (noting that the credit applies to earned 
income). 
 155. See Rev. Proc. 2018-18, 2018-10 I.R.B. § 3.05 (2018), 
https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-irbs/irb18-10.pdf (last visited Dec. 16, 2019) 
(providing the EITC Earned Income Amount and Phase-Out Thresholds for 2018) 
[https://perma.cc/E9AJ-2424].  
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but a 45% subsidy is likely to have significant effects on her life 
and the lives of her children. On the other hand, because the 
subsidy is significant for her, the phase-out might have a more 
significant disincentive effect on her labor choices than on those of 
Mr. Jones. For example, if Ms. Smith managed to get a job that 
paid ten dollars an hour and she was working 1900 hours per year, 
the phase-out would impact any additional work she performed, 
reducing her take-home pay by twenty-one cents for every dollar 
she earned (again, in addition to the payroll or self-employment 
taxes, which would reduce her pay by 7.65% or 15.3% 
respectively).156 Like Mr. Jones, Ms. Smith will not receive her 
EITC payment until months after the year is over, she will also 
likely pay someone to obtain them for her, and she may pay extra 
for a loan against the payment. If Ms. Smith receives child support 
payments from Mr. Jones, it will not be considered “earned” 
income, and so cannot increase or reduce the amount of her 
credit.157 
Finally, the way the credit is structured around family 
composition may have important implications for Ms. Smith’s 
domestic choices. First, if she were married to Mr. Jones, the two 
of them together could never receive more than the maximum 
credit of $6431, and so, in effect, Mr. Jones would lose his 
(relatively minor) credit.158 More importantly, their income would 
be aggregated for the purposes of the credit, so if both worked 
minimum wage jobs, their credit would start phasing out when the 
two of them reached an aggregate of 3358 hours of paid work (1679 
each).159 Because of that, the phase-out “poverty trap” affects 
                                                                                                     
 156. See Policy Basics, supra note 92 (applying the provided phase-out rate of 
21.06%, to the annual income of a single unmarried parent of three children);  see 
also I.R.C. § 32(b)(1) (2018) (providing the payroll tax and self-employment tax 
rates). 
 157. See What Is Earned Income?, IRS (2019), https://www.irs.gov/credits-
deductions/individuals/earned-income-tax-credit/earned-income (last visited Oct. 
23, 2019) (providing examples of income that are not earned income) 
[https://perma.cc/N4LG-QTFT].  
 158. See Rev. Proc. 2018-18, 2018-10 I.R.B. § 3.05 (2018), 
https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-irbs/irb18-10.pdf (last visited Dec. 16, 2019) 
(providing the maximum credit for a married couple filing jointly) 
[https://perma.cc/E9AJ-2424].  
 159. See id. (providing EITC Earned Income Amount and Phase-Out 
Thresholds for 2018). 
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married workers at far lower levels of work than unmarried 
parents of custodial children.160 Perhaps even more importantly, if 
they were married and filed separately (which they might do if 
they were separated and Ms. Smith wanted to keep her finances 
separate), neither could claim any credit at all.161 
Thus, the EITC is a quite successful program for 
supplementing the earned income of low-wage workers, but it 
provides no benefit for people who can’t earn income, creates a 
disincentive to earn for low and middle-income workers who are 
climbing out of poverty, distorts some choices about family 
structure, is delivered in a way that fails to maximize the benefit 
to its recipients, is mainly effective for parents with qualifying 
children, and is not large enough to guarantee that its recipients 
will not still be below the official poverty line. That is to say, it is 
work-conditional, means-tested, based on family-status, 
administered through the income-tax system, and moderate in 
overall amount. In its present form, the EITC appears to be quite 
different from a UBI. However, the next section discusses some 
ways that the EITC is actually closer to a UBI than other benefit 
programs.162 Finally, the last section discusses proposed reforms of 
the EITC that make it even more like a UBI.163 Most of these 
reforms have been proposed for many years by critics without tying 
them in any way to the concept of UBI.164 
IV. Similarities Between a UBI and the EITC 
As described above, there are profound differences between a 
UBI and the EITC.165 But when the EITC is compared to other 
more traditional anti-poverty programs, it becomes clear that the 
EITC already has some significant similarities to a UBI. These 
similarities are, at least arguably, significant contributors to the 
                                                                                                     
 160. See Policy Basics, supra note 92 (showing phase-out amounts for both 
single and married individuals).  
 161. See Smith & Drumbl, supra note 113, at 8 (“Married taxpayers cannot 
claim the EITC if using the married filing separately filing status.”).  
 162. Infra Part IV. 
 163. Infra Part V. 
 164. See infra Part V.  
 165. See supra Parts II–III (discussing various aspects of the UBI and EITC).   
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EITC’s successes.166 Political and scholarly commentators strongly 
emphasize the differences between “traditional welfare” programs 
and the EITC,167 and UBI enthusiasts distinguish a UBI from 
existing government anti-poverty programs in similar ways.168 For 
example, (i) like a UBI, the EITC is paid in cash not in-kind; (ii) 
like a UBI, the EITC has relatively few conditions, and those 
conditions are relatively easy for a bureaucracy to assess, 
decreasing administrative costs; (iii) like a UBI, the EITC is 
perceived to be less stigmatizing to recipients than “traditional 
welfare”; and (iv) the EITC’s phase-out is gradual enough that it 
probably creates very little disincentive to work.169 
A.  EITC Is Paid in Cash 
The most obvious similarity between a UBI and the EITC is 
the EITC is paid in cash, with no constraints on how the recipient 
spends it.170 This may seem like a simple thing, but it is actually 
quite different from the other largest transfer programs in the 
United States and is somewhat controversial. For example, 
arguably the largest anti-poverty program in the U.S. is Medicaid, 
which provides medical insurance to low-income U.S. residents.171 
Obviously, medical insurance is an in-kind benefit, and recipients 
who believe that they would be better off using the cost of those 
benefits for something other than medical insurance are unable to 
do so. Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (“SNAP”), 
usually called “food stamps,” is the second largest anti-poverty 
program in the United States, with 45.8 million recipient 
                                                                                                     
 166. See generally infra Parts IV.A–D (discussing the characteristics the UBI 
and EITC share).     
 167. See HALPERN-MEEKIN ET AL., supra note 8, at 6 (“It would be wrong to call 
the EITC the new welfare—it is unlike welfare in nearly every way one could 
imagine.”).  
 168. See VAN PARIJS & VANDERBORGHT, supra note 1, at 69. 
 169. See infra Parts IV.A–D.  
 170. See GAO-17-558, supra note 129, at 6 (describing the EITC as “cash 
assistance”). 
 171. See GAO-17-558, supra note 129, at 6 (reporting that an estimated 68.9 
million people were enrolled in Medicaid in 2015 at a total expenditure of 
approximately $330 billion).  
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families.172 A recipient of “food stamps” receives a debit card that 
can be used only at participating merchants and only for qualifying 
products.173 For example, the debit card cannot be used to buy hot 
foods, foods intended to be consumed on the premises, or nonfood 
items like toilet paper or cleaning supplies.174 In addition, because 
the card must be used with participating vendors, it cannot be used 
to purchase eggs or vegetables from a neighbor who raises or grows 
them.175 
For some UBI and EITC supporters, the difference between 
“in-kind” and “cash” benefits is important.176 For example, 
libertarians like Charles Murray argue that “[t]he limited 
competence of government is inherent,” and therefore distributing 
cash is inherently better than distributing governmentally 
selected benefits.177 The EITC—like a UBI and unlike an in-kind 
benefits program such as SNAP or Medicaid —is an unconditional 
cash transfer.178 It can be used for whatever the recipient thinks 
would benefit them the most. It can even be used to pay the fees 
that tax preparers charge for claiming it.179 Recipients of the EITC 
report strong perceived benefits of receiving money with which 
they can do whatever they want.180 Some purposely spend it on 
                                                                                                     
 172. See GAO-17-558, supra note 129, at 4 (comparing the largest 
anti--poverty programs in the United States by number of recipients).  
 173. See Facts About SNAP, U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC. (Aug. 14, 2019), 
https://www.fns.usda.gov/snap/facts (last visited Sept. 14, 2019) (detailing the 
process for using an Electronic Benefits Transfer card under the SNAP program) 
[https://perma.cc/9GMD-S233]. 
 174. See id. (listing the various foods that may not be purchased with SNAP 
benefits). 
 175. See id. (describing the process for using SNAP benefits via a connected 
point-of-sale terminal). 
 176. See VAN PARIJS & VANDERBORGHT, supra note 1, at 13 (arguing that cash 
is better than in-kind benefits because it creates administrative simplicity, 
eliminates pressures from lobbyists, and promotes individual choice).  
 177. CHARLES MURRAY, IN OUR HANDS:  A PLAN TO REPLACE THE WELFARE 
STATE 92 (rev. ed. 2016). 
 178. See GAO-17-558, supra note 129, at 4 (identifying the types of benefits 
offered by the largest government anti-poverty programs).  
 179. See GAO-17-558, supra note 129, at 4 (identifying “cash assistance” as 
the benefit derived from the EITC).  
 180. See HALPERN-MEEKIN ET AL., supra note 8, at 15–16 (discussing various 
ways in which individuals have benefited from of the EITC’s lack of in-kind 
restrictions). 
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things that may seem to some observers to be frivolous 
expenditures.181 They take their children to Disney World,182 for 
example, or they might have a lavish Christmas feast with 
wrapped presents and a costly tree.183 Most, however, use it to pay 
down debt and save at least some for future income shocks, 
something that one cannot do with in-kind or highly restricted 
benefits.184 Again, the fact that the EITC is an unconditional cash 
grant, like a UBI, means that recipients can do with it what they 
want, and that enhances their liberty and arguably their 
self-esteem. Some scholars argue that it can contribute to a mental 
shift that may actually have a significant effect on the climb out of 
poverty.185 
So, the fact that the EITC, just like a UBI, is paid in cash 
means that it has the same philosophical benefits of promoting 
liberty and autonomy. Similarly, cash payments under an EITC 
have the same economic benefit of permitting people to spend the 
money on whatever they think is best, which is more efficient to 
the degree that people generally make the best choices about how 
to use resources for their own happiness. 
                                                                                                     
 181. See Planet Money, Episode 451:  Why Some People Love Tax Day, NAT’L 
PUB. RADIO (Apr. 12, 2013, 9:30 AM), 
https://www.npr.org/sections/money/2013/04/12/177063399/episode-451-why-
some-people-love-tax-day (last visited Oct. 23, 2019) (discussing how one EITC 
beneficiary spent part of her credit on a trip to Disney World for her son) 
[https://perma.cc/ZNZ6-SFR5].  
 182. Id.  
 183. See HALPERN-MEEKIN ET AL., supra note 8, at 187 (“Most years, she has 
taken out a $1000 loan—an advance on the refund—in December, which covers 
Christmas gifts, but she has had to pay roughly $400 in interest and fees for the 
privilege; both are taken from her tax refund.”).  
 184. See HALPERN-MEEKIN ET AL., supra note 8, at 187 (“Nearly four in ten 
refund dollars are invested—used for purposes households associate with upward 
mobility—or saved.”);  Jessica Dickler & Sharon Epperson, Here’s What 
Americans Do with Their Tax Refunds, CNBC, 
https://www.cnbc.com/2019/03/01/heres-what-americans-will-do-with-their-tax-
refunds.html (last updated Mar. 31, 2019) (last visited Oct. 23, 2019) (discussing 
the results of a survey that asks what Americans do with the proceeds of their tax 
refunds) [https://perma.cc/9LA3-24C4].  
 185. See HALPERN-MEEKIN ET AL., supra note 8, at 19 (“In sum, the EITC 
seems to inspire future-oriented goals. And to some extent, it also seems to 
prompt the financially responsible behavior—thrift and debt payoff—that could 
lead to their fulfillment.”). 
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B.  EITC Is Administratively Simple 
Another similarity between the EITC and a UBI is that it is 
comparatively much simpler to administer than traditional 
welfare programs. The EITC is claimed by submitting a regular 
tax return to the IRS with a schedule attached.186 Other than the 
representations made on the form, no other supporting material is 
required.187 The form is then administered by the IRS, which 
already has the burden of collecting almost all the information on 
the schedule in order to administer the tax laws.188 Traditional 
welfare benefits require much more elaborate reporting, often 
involving face-to-face meetings between case workers and 
recipients.189 The relative simplicity of the EITC’s administration 
results in much lower administrative costs for the program.190 For 
example, the EITC’s program costs are estimated to be between 1 
and 1.85% of the benefits distributed, whereas the program costs 
in the food stamps program are estimated to be closer to 20 to 25% 
of benefits distributed.191 The low administrative barriers also 
results in higher participation rates among eligible potential 
recipients.192 Again, EITC participation is estimated at 89%, 
compared to a participation rate for food stamps that is about 
70%.193 Anecdotal evidence supports the view that traditional 
                                                                                                     
 186. See INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, 2016 PUB. NO. 
596, EARNED INCOME CREDIT (EIC) 18 (2016) (detailing the process for filing an 
EITC with a regular tax return). 
 187. See id. at 18–19 (detailing the process for filing an EITC with a regular 
tax return). 
 188. Id. 
 189. See Ventry, Welfare by Any Other Name, supra note 13, at 1264 
(describing the administrative simplicity of the EITC, relative to other social 
welfare programs).  
 190. See Ventry, Welfare by Any Other Name, supra note 13, at 1265 (“The 
sum total of [the EITC’s] administrative benefits results in lower costs and higher 
participation rates relative to direct transfer programs.”). 
 191. See Ventry, Welfare by Any Other Name, supra note 13, at 1265 (“The 
sum total of [the EITC’s] administrative benefits results in lower costs and higher 
participation rates relative to direct transfer programs.”). 
 192. See Ventry, Welfare by Any Other Name, supra note 13, at 1265 
(comparing a participation rate of up to 89% for the EITC with a rate closer to 
70% for the Food Stamps program). 
 193. See Ventry, Welfare by Any Other Name, supra note 13, at 1265 
(comparing a participation rate of up to 89% for the EITC with a rate closer to 
70% for the Food Stamps program). 
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anti-poverty programs can be complex enough that potential 
recipients are unable to make use of them, and that the EITC 
solves at least some of those problems. For example, Annie Lowrey 
reports the experience of one food stamps recipient who reported, 
“I lost food stamps three or four times because I couldn’t get the 
paperwork, or couldn’t call the right number. I did everything I 
was supposed to do.”194 The EITC, even though it is 
computationally complex and has some frustrating qualification 
rules that exclude some recipients, is much easier to claim, largely 
because the fact that it is a part of a regular tax form means that 
commercial tax-preparation firms make the claim for most 
recipients, for a fee of course.195 Even without any reform, this 
structure makes the benefit easier to claim than traditional 
anti-poverty programs. A UBI would likely be even simpler to 
administer, because its universality means that there are almost 
no qualifications to assess. But the administrative simplicity of the 
EITC is more like a UBI than traditional welfare programs. 
C.  EITC Is Not Experienced as Stigmatizing 
One of the claims most powerfully made by UBI supporters is 
that traditional anti-poverty programs are experienced as 
stigmatizing to their recipients.196 For example, in the introduction 
of their popular book, Philippe Van Parijs and Yannick 
Vanderborght link traditional anti-poverty programs to 
humiliation of their recipients.197 Annie Lowrey points out how 
racialized the discourse around antipoverty programs is in the 
United States, arguing that “[l]arge swaths of the American safety 
net and wealth-building programs were designed to exclude, 
                                                                                                     
 194. LOWREY, supra note 4, at 114–15. 
 195. Cf. Ventry, Welfare by Any Other Name, supra note 13, at 1264 & n.12 
(discussing benefits that result from administering social-welfare programs 
through the tax code). 
 196. See VAN PARIJS & VANDERBORGHT, supra note 1, at 7 (“[D]ue to their 
conditionality, [traditional anti-poverty programs] have an intrinsic tendency to 
turn their beneficiaries into a class of permanent welfare claimants.”). 
 197. See VAN PARIJS & VANDERBORGHT, supra note 1, at 7 (“People are entitled 
to continuing handouts on the condition that they remain destitute, and can prove 
it is involuntary. They are also subjected to more or less intrusive and humiliating 
procedures.”). 
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punish, and discipline the descendants of the country’s slaves.”198 
To the degree to which the administration of or the rhetoric around 
traditional anti-poverty programs are experienced as stigmatizing 
or racist, they may have a profound negative impact on their 
recipients. 
The EITC, on the other hand, again because it is folded into 
the tax system, requires no special application process or 
encounters with benefits administrators.199 Sarah 
Halpern-Meekin and her co-authors, who conducted an in-depth 
study of 115 families who received the EITC, report that their 
subjects had a much more positive experience of claiming and 
collecting their EITC check.200 She argues that, “[c]laiming 
benefits through the tax system is a much less stigmatized and 
socially isolating experience than waiting in line at the welfare 
office. Working families can get help without paying a social and 
psychological price.”201 To the degree to which a UBI is intended to 
reduce the social stigma associated with anti-poverty programs, it 
is possible that the EITC has already accomplished a significant 
portion of that goal. Additional reforms may make it even less 
stigmatizing. 
 
                                                                                                     
 198. LOWREY, supra note 4, at 138;  see generally MARTIN GILENS, WHY 
AMERICANS HATE WELFARE:  RACE, MEDIA, AND THE POLITICS OF ANTIPOVERTY 
POLICY (John Tryneski ed., 1999) (discussing the American public’s complicated 
views on welfare). 
 199. See Ventry, Welfare by Any Other Name, supra note 13, at 1264 (“In the 
case of the EITC, would-be tax-transfer claimants self-declare eligibility simply 
by filing a tax return.”). 
 200. See HALPERN-MEEKIN ET AL., supra note 8, at 20  
No welfare bureaucrats are controlling their lives. The working poor 
can exercise autonomy and spend that gloriously large lump sum 
however they please. When they arrive at that H&R Block office to 
collect their refund check, their status as beneficiaries of a cash 
assistance program is invisible. They are there because they filed their 
taxes just like every other hardworking American. Some evidence 
suggests that an enhanced sense of social inclusion might lead to other 
forms of prosocial behavior, such as political and civic engagement. 
 201. HALPERN-MEEKIN ET AL., supra note 8, at 193. 
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D. The EITC’s Phase-Out Is More Gradual than Most 
Means-Tested Programs 
Finally, a UBI is often contrasted to traditional anti-poverty 
programs by pointing out that a means-tested program creates 
disincentives to earn money for the recipients, which are removed 
in a true non-means-tested UBI.202 The EITC is a means-tested 
program, but its benefits phase out with earnings much more 
gradually than welfare programs imagined by UBI supporters, and 
somewhat more gradually than most actual traditional 
anti-poverty programs in the United States.203 
As noted above, many UBI advocates believe that the 
means-testing of traditional welfare programs function as a “cliff” 
or a “soak up.”204 In reality, almost all programs in the United 
States function as a phase-out, with benefits decreasing with 
earnings at some rate less than 100%.205 So, it is very rarely the 
case that a dollar of earnings results in a dollar loss of benefits. 
However, because most programs are more sharply targeted at 
poorer recipients than the EITC, most phase out more quickly than 
the EITC.206 The EITC also phases out at a higher level of income 
than most other anti-poverty programs,207 and so the disincentive 
to work it creates has less effect on people in poverty (and more 
effect on people at the upper end of the poverty line or just climbing 
out of poverty).208 
                                                                                                     
 202. Cf. Fleischer & Hemel, supra note 20, at 1269 (“We agree that a UBI is 
likely to be more efficient than the existing system of mean-tested in-kind 
transfers.”). 
 203. Compare supra notes 59–86 and accompanying text (discussing UBI 
supporters’ arguments in favor eliminating phase-outs in their entirety), with 
DANIEL N. SHAVIRO, EFFECTIVE MARGINAL TAX RATES ON LOW-INCOME 
HOUSEHOLDS 11–13 (1999) (describing the phase-out calculations for various 
government anti-poverty programs).  
 204. Supra notes 51–52. 
 205. See, e.g., SHAVIRO, supra note 203, at 11–13 (describing the current 
anti-poverty programs in the United States and their respective phase-outs).  
 206. See Daniel Shaviro, The Minimum Wage, the Earned Income Tax Credit, 
and Optimal Subsidy Policy, 64 U. CHI. L. REV. 405, 477–79 (1997) (analyzing the 
phase-out rates of government anti-poverty programs). 
 207. See id. at 477–79 (stating the levels of income at which various 
government anti-poverty programs have completely phased out).  
 208. See supra notes 53–58 and accompanying text (discussing the effect of 
phase-outs on the incentive to earn extra income).  
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As discussed above, a single parent of three children, for 
example, has their EITC phased out between $18,660 and $49,194 
of income.209 That phase-out creates an effective 21.06% marginal 
tax rate on income within the phase-out range. That compares 
favorably to most conceptions of a UBI that include a phase-out.210 
For example, Karl Widerquist, a UBI supporter, proposes a UBI 
with a 50% phase-out starting at the very first dollar of income.211 
Thus, the EITC “means-testing” phase-out, while still potentially 
having an adverse effect on recipients whose income puts them in 
the phase-out range, is not nearly as extreme as is imagined by 
some UBI advocates, and is also less extreme than most existing 
traditional anti-poverty programs in the United States. 
V. Four Proposals to Make the EITC More Like a UBI 
The EITC in its current form provides moderate income 
support to parents of minor children and has the strength of 
creating work incentives for very low-income workers, but it is 
criticized for (i) creating disincentives to work when the credit is 
being “phased out;” (ii) creating perverse incentives with respect to 
family structure and insufficiently supporting childless workers 
and noncustodial parents; (iii) being hampered by administrative 
complexity and delay; and (iv) being too small to eradicate poverty, 
especially for childless workers. Happily, all four of these criticisms 
could be addressed in an expanded EITC that functions more like 
a UBI. This section discusses how. 
                                                                                                     
 209. See Rev. Proc. 2018-18, 2018-10 I.R.B. 395 (2018), 
https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-irbs/irb18-10.pdf (last visited Dec. 16, 2019) 
(providing inflation-adjusted EITC amounts for 2018) [https://perma.cc/E9AJ-
2424] 
 210. See MELISSA S. KEARNY & MAGNE MOGSTAD, UNIVERSAL BASIC INCOME 
(UBI) AS A POLICY RESPONSE TO CURRENT CHALLENGES 5–7 (2019) (discussing the 
parameters for various UBI proposals and pilot programs).  
 211. Karl Widerquist, The Cost of Basic Income: Back-of-the-Envelope 
Calculations, BASIC INCOME STUD. (2017), 
https://works.bepress.com/widerquist/75 (last visited Oct. 23, 2019) 
[https://perma.cc/FK72-ZMW2];  see also MURRAY, supra note 177, at 8 (proposing 
a relatively gradual phase-out, starting with 10% and increasing by 4% with each 
subsequent $5000, but capping at $60,000). 
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A.  Do Not Phase Out the Credit 
The first proposal is perhaps the most radical, and (for that 
reason?) has not been advocated in any of the existing proposals to 
reform the EITC that I know of, but it would have some very 
significant benefits. That reform is to remove the phase-out of the 
benefit, so once a worker earned sufficient income to qualify for the 
maximum credit, they would receive it no matter how high their 
income got during the year. The primary benefit of such a structure 
is that it would remove the concentrated work disincentives (the 
“poverty trap”) caused by the phase-out of the benefit.212 It would 
also dramatically simplify the administrative burden because the 
government would not need to withdraw benefits as income rises 
in the phase-out range.213 Once it was determined that a recipient 
earned enough to qualify for the full credit, both the recipient and 
the government could rely on the fact that the recipient qualified 
for the full credit, without any concern that future earnings would 
reduce the credit the recipient was due.214 This reform would make 
further reforms described later much easier to implement, 
especially distributing the benefit monthly instead of annually. 
As discussed above, UBI advocates argue that a universal 
benefit with no phase-out is superior to a means-tested benefit for 
two primary reasons. First, removing the phase-out eradicates the 
poverty trap by eliminating the work disincentives created by 
phasing out the benefit.215 Second, removing the phase-out 
dramatically simplifies the administration of a benefit program.216 
                                                                                                     
 212. See SHAVIRO, supra note 203, at 18 (describing the benefits of refraining 
from phasing out a benefit program);  see also Lily L. Batchelder, Fred T. Goldberg 
& Peter R. Orsag, Reforming Tax Incentives into Uniform Refundable Tax Credits, 
BROOKINGS INST. (Aug. 1, 2006) (describing the benefits of refraining from phasing 
out a benefit program). 
 213. See Batchfelder, Goldberg & Orsag, supra note 212 (discussing the 
administrative costs of benefits). 
 214. See SHAVIRO, supra note 203, at 17 (comparing the phase-out structure 
to a demogrant structure of distributing benefits).  
 215. See Alstott, Why the EITC Doesn’t Make Work Pay, supra note 14, at 549 
(“For workers in the EITC phase-out range, the EITC creates an unambiguous 
potential work disincentive.”). 
 216. See Alstott, Why the EITC Doesn’t Make Work Pay, supra note 14, at 566 
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Both of these arguments in favor of a non-means-tested program 
apply in the case of the EITC.217 
With respect to the work disincentive created by the phase-out 
of the EITC, first it is important to point out that the majority of 
EITC claimants are in the phase-out range.218 Thus—at least 
theoretically—the EITC should disincentivize work for many more 
recipients than for those whose labor participation is 
incentivized.219 In fact, for three quarters of all EITC recipients, 
the credit serves as a disincentive to earn additional income 
(because they are in the phase-out range) rather than an incentive, 
although the magnitude of the disincentive is very hard to 
assess.220 There is some consensus among economists doing 
empirical work that the phase-in of the EITC increases labor 
participation by single mothers, persuading some mothers who are 
not earning money to work in the market economy.221 But the 
                                                                                                     
(“[P]articular issues of EITC administration sometimes overlook the structural 
features that create those problems and make those problems resistant to 
reform.”), 589 (arguing for greater accessibility and cheaper administration). 
 217. Compare Fleischer & Hemel, supra note 20, at 1263–66 (discussing the 
problems with phase-outs in a UBI program), with Alstott, Why the EITC Doesn’t 
Make Work Pay, supra note 14, at 566 (discussing similar issues with phase-outs 
in an EITC program). 
 218. See, e.g., Nada Eissa & Hilary Hoynes, Redistribution and Tax 
Expenditures: The Earned Income Tax Credit 5 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, 
Working Paper No. 14307, 2008) (explaining that three quarters of people getting 
the EITC are in the phase-out range). 
 219.  See Chris Edwards & Veronique de Rugy, Earned Income Tax Credit: 
Small Benefits, Large Costs, CATO INST. TAX & BUDGET BULL. NO. 73 (Oct. 14, 
2015), https://www.cato.org/publications/tax-budget-bulletin/earned-income-tax-
credit-small-benefits-large-costs (last visited Oct. 23, 2019) (“[F]or most recipients 
[the EITC] creates a disincentive to increase earnings.”) [https://perma.cc/7PJR-
XT7F];  see also Alstott, Why the EITC Doesn’t Make Work Pay, supra note 14, at 
549 (“For workers in the EITC phase-out range, the EITC creates an 
unambiguous potential work disincentive.”). 
 220. See, e.g., HALPERN-MEEKIN ET AL., supra note 8, at 7  
[T]he reach of the EITC is roughly five times that of the old welfare 
system, even when the welfare rolls reached their peak of roughly five 
million households in 1993 and 1994. This is due to a very gradual 
falloff in benefits . . . [so that] the EITC serves such a large percentage 
of American households (about one in five) that it looks more like a 
universal program than a program for the poor, at least from the point 
of view of those at the bottom. 
 221. See Austin Nichols & Jesse Rothstein, The Earned Income Tax Credit 
(EITC) 40 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 21211, 2015) 
(summarizing empirical research findings on labor participation and the EITC). 
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economic literature attempting to assess the disincentive effect of 
the phase-out range is much more complicated and does not result 
in any clear findings.222 Therefore, it is not clear how substantial 
the disincentive effect of the EITC phase-out is. However, it is 
perfectly reasonable to assume that the EITC phase-out acts as a 
disincentive to work as much as a 21.6% additional marginal 
income tax rate would, if you assume that the phase-out and the 
tax are equally salient to the worker.223  
The administrative simplification that comes from removing 
the EITC phase-out is not so impressive when discussed in 
isolation. The EITC is already administered through the tax code, 
and the information determining level of qualification is collected 
on an income tax return. If there was no phase-out, taxpayers 
would still need to collect the same information about income that 
they do currently, since they would still need to file a full 
income-tax return in order to claim the reformed EITC. The fact 
that they could be confident throughout the year that additional 
earnings would not disqualify them for EITC benefits might have 
incentive effects but would not really simplify filing much. At best, 
it might encourage some recipients to file, even if they might have 
avoided filing currently, because they erroneously believed that 
they earned too much to qualify. As discussed later, however, the 
removal of the phase-out would have substantial simplification 
effects if the program were reformed to permit periodic (as opposed 
to annual) payments of the EITC benefits.224 That reform is much 
more difficult if the EITC benefit phases out as income rises.  
There are two primary objections to removing the phase-out of 
the EITC. The first is that it would be too “costly” to pay the benefit 
to so many people.225 The second is that it is unfair or inefficient to 
make payments to people who do not need the money.226 On further 
                                                                                                     
 222. See id. at 43–47 (summarizing the economic literature on the effect of the 
EITC phase-out on number of hours worked). 
 223. See id. at 45 (explaining that one theory about the difficulty in observing 
an effect of the EITC on number of hours worked is that participants may have 
difficulty in predicting how their work affects the amount of credit they receive). 
 224. See infra Part V.C. 
 225. See Shaviro, supra note 206, at 408 (“Thus, the EITC supposedly would 
‘cost’ more if it were not phased out.”). 
 226. See SHAVIRO supra note 203, at 17–18 (entertaining a hypothetical 
scenario where Bill Gates receives food stamps). 
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examination, neither objection is as damning as it might initially 
appear, although neither is trivial. First, it is hard to conceive of 
the true cost because the majority of people will both be paying for 
the benefit (presumably through some form of taxation) and 
receiving it. If taxes go up by $5000 for someone who under the 
reformed law receives a $5000 EITC payment that they previously 
would not have received, then the new benefit has no “cost” to 
them. So, in effect, there is no way to adequately assess the cost of 
removing the phase-out of the EITC without calculating the 
changes that would be made to the tax code to pay for the reform. 
It is beyond the scope of this paper to attempt any such 
calculation.227 As for fairness and efficiency, the same response 
applies:  It is impossible to say whether providing a tax credit to 
high-income people is fair unless we know how the tax code has 
been changed to fund this payment. 
B. Pay on an Individual Basis 
Paying the EITC on an individual basis means paying the 
same amount to an individual regardless of marriage status or 
living arrangements. It does not mean that there can be no 
payment on account of children, that children need to receive the 
same amount per person as adults, or that the payment on account 
of children cannot be made to a parent on the basis of custody. So, 
reforming the EITC so that it is calculated on an individual basis 
solves some of the criticisms that have been leveled against the 
current EITC because of its treatment of family status and 
composition, but not all of them.228 It is widely recognized that the 
family status provisions are the source of the greatest complexity 
in claiming and administering the EITC.229 As discussed above, the 
                                                                                                     
 227. I hope to assess possible funding sources and structures in a future work. 
 228. See Alstott, Why the EITC Doesn’t Make Work Pay, supra note 14, at 539–
41 (discussing problematic familial aspects of the EITC and stating that the EITC 
has enjoyed support because of its assertion as a “pro-family” alternative). 
 229. See, e.g., HOLT, supra note 14, at 3 
The greatest complications result from two specific sources: first, the 
requirement that the child live with the claiming taxpayer for more 
than half the year (and in the [United States]), and second, the rules 
determining who may receive the credit when more than one taxpayer 
is eligible to claim the same child. 
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benefit claimed by any adult is dependent on whether they are the 
custodial parent of any qualifying children.230 Adult qualification 
depends on both marital status and factual questions about where 
children lived and who lived with them over the course of the 
year.231 If a child is assigned to the wrong parent, even 
accidentally, both parents’ tax returns are erroneous (or even 
potentially fraudulent).232 One powerful illustration of the fine line 
that can separate even fraudulent returns from accurate ones is 
the treatment of the children of unmarried parents. If both parents 
live for over half the year with their children, the IRS permits 
those parents to choose which parent should claim the children, 
and there is nothing wrong with assigning the children to parents 
in order to maximize the amount of credit received.233 However, if 
one of the parents lives with the children for less than half the 
year, then that parent cannot choose how to allocate the 
children.234 Only the parent who lived with the child for half the 
year is eligible to claim the credit.235 In fact, if the parents decide 
to assign the child to the noncustodial parent, they could be guilty 
of tax fraud (a criminal offense) and their mistaken impression 
that the IRS permitted them to choose which parent could claim 
the child would not be a defense.236 This complexity, and the 
noncompliance it creates, has very real effects.237 It keeps some 
                                                                                                     
 230. See supra Part III.C (discussing how after three children, there is no 
additional benefit to the parents so the structure creates an incentive for parents 
of multiple children to remain unmarried and each claim at least one child to 
maximize their benefits).  
 231. See supra Part III.C (“These and other family-structure issues create 
potentially perverse incentives around marriage and cohabitation.”). 
 232. See Basic Qualifications, IRS, https://www.eitc.irs.gov/eitc-
central/about-eitc/basic-qualifications/basic-qualifications (last updated Feb. 6, 
2019) (last visited Oct. 23, 2019) (describing the criteria for a qualifying child) 
[https://perma.cc/8H8W-9SRY]. 
 233. See Smith & Drumbl, supra note 113, at 14 (explaining flexibility parents 
have when both meet the requirements to claim a child for EITC purposes). 
 234. See Basic Qualifications, supra note 232 (describing the criteria for a 
qualifying child). 
 235. See Basic Qualifications, supra note 232 (describing the eligibility 
requirements). 
 236. See I.R.S. Publication 501 (2018) (explaining when a child will be treated 
as the qualifying child of the noncustodial parent). 
 237. See Consequences of Not Meeting Your Due Diligence Requirements, IRS, 
https://www.eitc.irs.gov/tax-preparer-toolkit/preparer-due-diligence/consequence
s-of-failing-to-meet-your-due-diligence (last updated Apr. 1, 2019) (last visited 
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people from receiving the credit even though they qualify for it.238 
It decreases confidence in the tax system and government.239 It 
causes a misallocation of IRS enforcement resources.240 And for 
some people, it increases suspicion that fraud and noncompliance 
are endemic to the EITC program, decreasing the popular goodwill 
towards it and reinforcing negative stereotypes about the poor and 
near-poor.241 One could greatly reduce this complexity by crafting 
the EITC as a credit for each adult, and then a credit for each child 
that may be claimed by an adult on behalf of the child. For 
example, one could imagine an EITC in which each adult received 
a maximum credit of $519 (the 2018 maximum credit for childless 
adults), and each child received a maximum credit of $2942 based 
on the earnings of any adult with which they live.242 Under this 
system, it would be irrelevant if adults are married to each other, 
and it would take away the incentive to “split” children between 
two parents.243 Of course, because the credit is the same for each 
child, the new system removes the old system’s disincentive to 
have multiple children (especially more than three).244 
When combined with the removal of the phase-out, described 
above, the change to an individual structure creates even more 
substantial benefits. That is, because no person can earn too much 
                                                                                                     
Oct. 23, 2019) (setting forth the penalties the IRS can assess for failure to comply 
with due diligence requirements) [https://perma.cc/L2EN-QHBU]. 
 238. See HOLT, supra note 14, at iii (“A quarter of EITC payments are 
categorized as improper.”). 
 239. See HOLT supra note 14, at 19 (stating that government officials are 
muddling through, not meaningfully addressing the challenges the IRS faces). 
 240. See HOLT, supra note 14, at 4 (stating that few additional resources were 
provided for implementation of the EITC).  
 241. See HOLT, supra note 14, at 10 (stating that these programs are 
frequently viewed with suspicion, not lessened by subpar compliance with EITC 
rules). 
 242. See Rev. Proc. 2018-18, 2018-10 I.R.B. § 3.05 (2018), 
https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-irbs/irb18-10.pdf (last visited Dec. 16, 2019) 
(announcing EITC Earned Income Amount and Phase-Out Thresholds for 2018) 
[https://perma.cc/E9AJ-2424]. The current maximum credit for a family with one 
child is $3461; therefore, if a parent receives $519 in the proposed system, the 
child credit must be $2942 for parents to receive a larger benefit in the new 
system. 
 243. See HOLT, supra note 14, at 17 (discussing how separate benefits removes 
incentives for illegitimate behaviors and would result in improved compliance). 
 244. See I.R.C. § 32(b)(1) (2018) (providing no additional credit for families 
with more than three children). 
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to receive the credit anymore, there is no disincentive for a 
low-income parent to get married to a higher-income person. 
Finally, one could remove some of the incentives to have additional 
children by adjusting the magnitude of the benefit between 
children and adults to increase the credit per adult and decrease 
the credit per child. This could be done in a way that no one was 
worse off than they are under the current system. For example, 
one could increase the adult credit to $3720, and decrease the child 
credit to $1000 without anyone receiving a smaller credit than they 
would under the current system.245 This proposed system would be 
more expensive than the first proposal, but would do a better job 
of supporting poor people without custody of children, would do an 
equal job of supporting people with children, diminish the 
dramatic difference in benefits between parents with children and 
people without, and decrease the incentive to have multiple 
children.246 
C.  Deliver in Cash Monthly 
The third proposed modification of the EITC is for a 
governmental agency to make direct monthly payments to each 
recipient, rather than for recipients to receive the credit as a single 
annual payment months after the end of the year in which the 
recipient qualifies.247 This direct monthly payment has a number 
of benefits (timing, simplicity, less cost to beneficiaries), but was 
                                                                                                     
 245. The maximum credit for a parent with two children is $5716; so, if the 
parent with two children received $3720, they would need $1000 per child in order 
for no one to receive less under the proposed plan than the current system. See 
Rev. Proc. 2018-18, 2018-10 I.R.B. § 3.05 (announcing EITC Earned Income 
Amount and Phase-Out Thresholds for 2018).  
 246. There have been a number of recent proposals to expand EITC coverage 
for noncustodial parents and for childless workers, including in former President 
Obama’s 2016 Budget and by Paul Ryan, the former Republican Chair of the 
House Ways and Means Committee. See OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, EXEC. 
OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, BUDGET OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT, FISCAL 
YEAR 2016 (2015);  Dylan Matthews, Paul Ryan’s Poverty Plan, VOX (Oct. 8, 2015), 
https://www.vox.com/2014/7/24/18080430/paul-ryan-poverty (last visited Oct. 23, 
2019) [https://perma.cc/8SWC-NNP2];  see also Nichols & Rothstein, supra note 
221, at 52 (discussing theories for how to improve the EITC program). 
 247. See Nichols & Rothstein, supra note 221, at 52 (noting dissatisfaction 
over the lump-sum payment). 
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previously difficult or impossible to accomplish because of the 
structure of the EITC program.248 Once the two changes proposed 
above are made—removing the phase-out and making the benefit 
individual—the barriers to a monthly direct payment are reduced 
such that the proposal is no longer outlandish.249 In the UBI 
literature, there is very little discussion of the differential benefit 
of monthly as against annual distribution.250 However, in the EITC 
literature, the issue is of constant interest, and heated debate.251 
That is because basic economic theory (and common sense) 
suggests that if people are going to receive a certain sum of money, 
they would be better off receiving it earlier and more often, rather 
than in one largish chunk at the end of the year.252 But there is a 
persistent theme in the EITC literature about the benefits of 
annual lump-sum distribution.253 The structure of the EITC 
program is an impediment to more frequent distribution, however, 
                                                                                                     
 248. See Nichols & Rothstein, supra note 221, at 52 (discussing the benefits 
of monthly payments). 
 249. See Nichols & Rothstein, supra note 221, at 53 (discussing the drawbacks 
of monthly payments). 
 250. While the difference between annual and more frequent payment is not 
often discussed, the difference between a single lifetime payment (sometimes 
called a “Basic Endowment”) and periodic payments (whether monthly or some 
other period) is an important debate among UBI advocates. See, e.g., VAN PARIJS 
& VANDERBORGHT, supra note 1, at 29–31 (discussing payments in several large 
installments as opposed to monthly distributions); see also BRUCE ACKERMAN ET 
AL., REDESIGNING REDISTRIBUTION:  BASIC INCOME AND STAKEHOLDER GRANTS AS 
CORNERSTONES FOR AN EGALITARIAN CAPITALISM 159 (2006) (discussing the 
arguments for basic endowments instead of monthly payments). 
 251. See, e.g., Alstott, The Earned Income Tax Credit and the Limitations of 
Tax-based Welfare Reform, supra note 14, at 561 (stating the EITC cannot get 
money to taxpayers during the year when they need it); see MICHELLE L. DRUMBL, 
IMPROVING TAX CREDITS FOR THE WORKING POOR (2019) (“Could EITC reform 
include year-round delivery?”); see also STEVE HOLT, PERIODIC PAYMENT OF THE 
EARNED INCOME TAX CREDIT REVISITED 4–5 (2015) (making a case for periodic 
payments). See generally HALPERN-MEEKIN ET AL., supra note 8 (discussing how 
the EITC was meant to help lift people out of poverty). See Brian Galle & Manuel 
Utset, Is Cap and Trade Fair to the Poor? Shortsighted Households and the 
Timing of Consumption Taxes, 79 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 33, 62 (2010) (discussing 
the shortcomings of lump-sum payment regimes). 
 252. See Nichols & Rothstein, supra note 221, at 25 (“[A] lump-sum payment 
has a smaller effect on the household’s utility than would a series of smaller 
payments throughout the year.”). 
 253. See e.g., HALPERN-MEEKIN ET AL., supra note 8, at 9 (“The lump sum at 
tax time can feel like an answer to a prayer.”). 
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and has made it difficult to even conceive of how to reform the 
program to facilitate monthly payments.254 
A discontinued feature of the EITC illustrates how hard it is 
to craft a good periodic payment system for the EITC without also 
making other changes to the program.255 Between 1979 and 2010, 
a taxpayer could receive an “advance” on their EITC in each 
paycheck by filing a form with their employer, who would then 
decrease the taxpayer’s withholding or make a positive 
disbursement of advance EITC (“Advanced Earned Income Credit” 
or “AEIC”).256 This program was intended to permit a taxpayer to 
smooth receipt of the credit for all the reasons described above.257 
However, there was never a time that more than 2% of EITC 
claimants chose to receive advance payments, which eventually 
resulted in Congress eliminating the option in 2010.258 As Steve 
Holt succinctly puts it, “For years, the principal objection to 
developing a periodic payment option has been simple:  The belief 
that nobody (or hardly anyone) wants it.”259 This belief came 
largely from the simple fact that take up of the AEIC is so low.260  
But there are good reasons that an EITC recipient would 
dislike the AEIC program, even if it would have been beneficial to 
receive the money weekly.261 For example, low-income taxpayers 
                                                                                                     
 254. See Nichols & Rothstein, supra note 221, at 52 (stating that while there 
is ambition to change the method of payment, there is a lack of workable proposals 
on how to do this). 
 255. See Nichols & Rothstein, supra note 221, at 13 (describing the “Advance 
EIC” which was offered from 1979 to 2010). 
 256. See Nichols & Rothstein, supra note 221, at 13 (describing the “Advance 
EIC”). 
 257. See Nichols & Rothstein, supra note 221, at 13 (explaining the program). 
 258. See HOLT, supra note 251, at 5 (“[F]or many, the [small amount it boosted 
each paycheck was] not worth the risk of potentially owing money back at the end 
of the year.”). 
 259.  See HOLT, supra note 251, at 15 (“Indeed the experience with the AEIC 
creates a presumption that—whatever the merits for addressing financial need—
the intended beneficiaries are not interested in moving away from the single 
lump-sum payment that provides very large refunds to many.”).  
 260. See HOLT, supra note 251, at 15 (describing how other countries’ 
programs can explain variable take-up rates in advance payment option 
programs, with Canada’s “Working Income Tax Benefit” program having very low 
take-up rates in periodic payment plans as compared to very high take-up (about 
90 percent) in New Zealand’s “Working Family Tax Credits.”). 
 261. See HOLT, supra note 251, at 5 (discussing the reasons why the AEIC 
never caught on).  
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may have been (accurately) afraid that they would be required to 
pay back some portion of what they received during the year.262 
That is because the advance payments did not represent a final 
determination about eligibility for the credit.263 It was just an 
estimate, subject to recapture at the end of the year if the recipient 
did not actually qualify for the amount they had received. In other 
words, an AEIC recipient might be faced with a large mandatory 
payment to the government at tax time. Because the amount of 
EITC benefit is based on child custody, earnings, and sometimes 
the earnings of multiple taxpayers, predicting how much will be 
available at the beginning of the year is difficult, even for 
taxpayers with relatively stable sources of income. For this reason, 
any kind of “advance payment” system for the EITC has to account 
for what happens if a child ends up living with a different parent 
than predicted, or a parent moves out of the family home, or one 
parent earns less than predicted, or more than predicted, or a 
couple gets married or divorced during the year.264 Each of these 
events could cause a taxpayer to receive less EITC than she 
predicted. It makes sense that low-income taxpayers view the risk 
of having to make a large lump-sum payment at tax time to be an 
especially onerous event, and many who find themselves in that 
situation experience it as an especially painful financial shock.265 
                                                                                                     
 262. See HOLT, supra note 251, at 5 (mentioning the risk of potentially owing 
money back at the end of the year). 
 263. See HOLT, supra note 251, at 18 (stating that a key flaw of the AEIC was 
that a single paycheck from a single employer is a poor indicator of household 
eligibility). 
 264. See, e.g., Nichols & Rothstein, supra note 221, at 52 (explaining that the 
annual lump-sum payment structure of the EITC prevents it from being as 
effective as it might be, but that the authors “are not aware of workable proposals” 
to institute an advance EITC program that would not suffer from the fatal flaw 
of requiring some people to repay large sums at tax time).  
 265. See, e.g., HOLT, supra note 251, at 19 (“The greatest concerns expressed 
by Colorado simulation participants were the inability to guess one’s income and 
fear of the consequences of making a mistake.”); see also Greene, supra note 14, 
at 561–62 
[W]hen we asked families if they would be interested in a program like 
the AEITC, they overwhelmingly told us that they would prefer to 
receive the EITC as a lump sum—as they currently receive it [at least 
partially because] they were afraid that if they took an advance on the 
money, they would ultimately owe the IRS money at the end of the 
year.  
See also HALPERN-MEEKIN ET AL., supra note 8, at 72 (“The lump sum is also 
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On the other hand, if the EITC were reformed to provide 
benefits individually, rather than based on family status, it would 
be easier to predict at least the range of potential benefits any 
individual worker would be entitled to.266 Of course, there would 
still need to be a determination of what responsible adult should 
receive a distribution intended for the support of a child, but the 
process could be simplified, and could be made to depend only on 
information available prior to making a distribution, so there 
would not be a need for the government to recapture payments that 
were made because of inaccurate predictions. Even more 
importantly, if the phase-out of the EITC were removed, then the 
amount of EITC a taxpayer received would only depend on income 
in the phase-in range. Once a taxpayer earned the threshold 
amount, her EITC credit would be secure for the year. Since 
significantly more taxpayers earn income in the phase-out range 
than in the phase-in range, that would mean that many fewer 
taxpayers would be uncertain about how much EITC they qualify 
for.267 In other words, reforming the EITC so it was no longer 
dependent on family status and no longer was lost as income rose 
above a threshold amount would make it much easier to 
administer a monthly distribution, since the need for the 
government to recapture periodic payments made to taxpayers 
who turned out not to be eligible simply because they incorrectly 
predicted their family status or earned more than they expected.268 
                                                                                                     
popular because low-wage workers are strongly averse to a particular form of 
financial risk: owing the IRS money at the end of the year.”);  DRUMBL, supra note 
251, at 2 (theorizing that taxpayers did not participate in the AEITC because “1) 
taxpayers did not like having the employer act as an intermediary for something 
so personal . . .; 2) taxpayers were . . . worried about owing something back at tax 
time; and 3) . . . larger amounts of money are psychologically more meaningful.”). 
There is also evidence that other factors led to the low participation rate, like poor 
understanding of the AEIC program, the fact that it relied on employer 
participation, administrative complexity, and the fact that most EITC recipients 
have their tax returns processed by paid preparers, who have an incentive for the 
recipients to receive as large a refund from their tax filing as possible. 
 266. See Nichols & Rothstein, supra note 221, at 52 (discussing potential 
changes regarding non-custodial parents’ credits).  
 267. See Eissa & Hoynes, supra note 218, at 5 (explaining that three quarters 
of people getting the EITC are in the flat or phase-out range). 
 268. See Nichols & Rothstein, supra note 221, at 52 (stating people have 
suggested strategies to improve administration). 
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Once these reforms are made, the program could be made even 
simpler, if that was desired. For example, one could imagine a 
program in which a taxpayer receives their first year of EITC “for 
free” without any showing that they met the earnings requirement 
(maybe on one’s eighteenth birthday). In that year, the taxpayer 
would receive their individual benefit every month in an amount 
equal to one twelfth of the maximum annual benefit.269 Each 
person would receive a government-issued debit card in that year 
(or they could opt to have their benefit direct-deposited into an 
account at a financial institution).270 Then, for each subsequent 
year, the taxpayer would receive benefits based on the prior year’s 
earnings. 271 If the taxpayer earned the threshold amount in the 
prior year, he or she would continue to receive one twelfth of the 
maximum annual benefit every month. If the taxpayer earned less 
than the threshold amount in the prior year, then he or she would 
only earn an amount based on the prior year earnings. Of course, 
that means that if the taxpayer earns less than the threshold 
amount in some year, but then in a subsequent year earns more, 
the EITC would not reflect the increased earnings until the year 
following the year of increased earnings, much like it does under 
the current system.272 On the other hand, in years in which 
taxpayer’s income declined, the EITC benefit would not decline 
until the following year, cushioning the taxpayer from the adverse 
effect of the earnings decline, at least somewhat. 
An EITC that was dependent only on whether an individual 
had enough earnings to get the maximum credit in the prior year 
would be infinitely easier to administer than the current EITC 
(which is already quite easy). In fact, for some taxpayers, there 
would be no need to even file a tax return to get it. For employees, 
income could be verified directly from the Social Security 
                                                                                                     
 269. Proposals like these have been made by others. See, e.g., DRUMBL, supra 
note 251 (proposing how to reform the EITC); see also Galle & Utsett, supra note 
251, at 85 (setting out proposed reforms, including possibilities of government 
intervention). 
 270. See Galle & Utsett, supra note 251, at 85 (“We suggest that self-directed 
debit cards . . . can fill this need.”).  
 271. See Eissa & Hoynes, supra note 218, at 4 (“[C]urrent year EITC is tied 
to prior year income . . . .”). 
 272. Cf. Eissa & Hoynes, supra note 218, at 4 (“Finally, current year EITC is 
tied to prior year income, which may lead to inefficiencies given that employment 
and living arrangements change frequently for the low-income population.”) 
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Administration without the filing of a tax return.273 That way, 
recipients could be saved the cost of tax preparation,274 the cost of 
refund-anticipation loans,275 and at least some of the money that 
low-income workers pay in credit-card and payday loans to 
accelerate their receipt of the EITC currently.276 
But of course, for taxpayers who both receive the credit and 
owe tax, any program design that decouples receipt of the credit 
from filing a tax return is likely to reduce tax compliance.277 One 
of the benefits of the current EITC is that the fact that it is 
embedded in the income tax system means that recipients have to 
file taxes in order to receive the credit, and so the EITC creates 
tax-return filing norms and practices among low-income workers 
that may well persist as income rises for those workers.278 For that 
reason, any program design that decouples receipt of the credit 
from tax filing would have to reincorporate some mechanism to 
create consequences for taxpayers who fail to file tax returns. For 
example, receipt of any credit in the following year might be 
dependent on adequately meeting one’s tax filing obligations in the 
current year. 
Once the reforms proposed above were made, it would be much 
easier to administer the child component as a periodic cash 
payment throughout the year. For example, the issue of which 
                                                                                                     
 273. See Hemel & Fleischer, supra note 67 (manuscript at 50–51) (proposing 
the administration of a UBI through the Social Security Administration rather 
than the IRS, which would be possible for a reformed EITC as well). 
 274. See HALPERN-MEEKIN ET. AL., supra note 8, at 69 (describing how the 
largest provider of tax preparations services to low-income taxpayers is H&R 
Block, which charges $192 for “the most basic return” and extra for each 
additional schedule, including the one for the EITC). 
 275. See generally Andrew T. Hayashi, The Effects of Refund Anticipation 
Loans on the Use of Paid Preparers and EITC Takeup (Va. Law & Econ., Working 
Paper No. 2016-9, 2016); see also HALPERN-MEEKIN ET AL., supra note 8 at 187 
(describing an EITC recipient borrowing $1000 in December and paying $400 in 
interest and fees, paid out of her tax refund, which is paid in February). 
 276.  See Galle & Utset, supra note 251, at 87 (“Currently, many households 
use refund anticipation loans to get early access to their EITC payment . . . .”).  
 277. See Nichols & Rothstein, supra note 221, at 12 (explaining that the 
credit, when coupled with the filing of a tax return, acts as an incentive for one to 
file taxes).  
 278. See Nichols & Rothstein, supra note 221, at 12 (noting that the 
establishment of good tax habits early and in low-income workers correlates with 
the habits continuing as their earnings rise.) 
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adult can claim a child for EITC purposes is made more 
complicated by the fact that some adults earn too much money to 
qualify for the full credit, and so it is in the interests of the IRS to 
make sure that no adult claims the benefit unless they really 
deserve it. If a child lives seven months in the house of a relatively 
high-earning parent (in the phase-out range or beyond), and only 
five months in the house of the lower-earning parent, only the 
higher-earning parent is eligible for the credit.279 If the 
lower-earning parent claims it, more money is distributed from the 
government, and the IRS must be concerned to prevent such 
improper payments. If there is no phase-out of benefits, then each 
parent can receive the full credit, and it simply doesn’t matter from 
the government’s point of view which parent claims the credit (as 
long as only one does). In that situation, it really would be 
appropriate for there to be an administrative system that ensured 
that only one parent received the credit but permitted qualifying 
adults to decide amongst themselves which adult should receive 
it.280  
Therefore, the three reforms proposed so far—removing the 
phase-out of benefits, paying the credit on an individual basis, and 
paying the benefit monthly—all work together to make the EITC 
simpler in all ways. It would be easy for the government to 
administer it, easy for the recipient to claim it, easy for everyone 
to understand who got it and in what amounts. People could plan 
their lives around it, making whatever choices they thought were 
best knowing that the benefit would be available to them so long 
as they earned money. No other factors would be relevant, and no 
conditions would be placed on the use of the money. Just like a 
UBI.281 
                                                                                                     
 279. See Other EITC Issues, IRS, https://www.irs.gov /faqs/earned-income-
tax-credit/other-eitc-issues/other-eitc-issues (last visited Apr. 6, 2019) (explaining 
that the IRS tiebreaker for unmarried parents who both claim the same 
qualifying child is whichever parent the child has lived with longer during the tax 
year) [https://perma.cc/4HRU-KBZS]. 
 280. The benefit would differ between adults if either was in the phase-in 
range, and therefore received less than the full benefit. But, as discussed 
previously, far fewer recipients are in the phase-in range than the phase-out 
range, and the simplification proposals offered in this Article would reduce that 
number even more. 
 281. See Heller, supra note 3, at 65–66 (explaining that “[a] universal basic 
income, or U.B.I., is a fixed income that every adult—rich or poor, working or 
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D.  Make It Bigger 
The final proposed modification of the EITC is the one that is 
conceptually the simplest, but probably the most difficult in 
practice, and that is to simply make it bigger. With good reason, 
UBI advocates are often vague about the exact magnitude of a 
proposed UBI, but there is some general consensus at least about 
the goals of a UBI, and these goals give some indication of an 
appropriate size.282  
In principle, a government fixes the basic income at a level to 
allow subsistence but also to encourage enterprise and effort for 
the enjoyment of more prosperity. In the U.S., its supporters 
generally propose a figure somewhere around a thousand 
dollars a month: enough to live on . . . but not nearly enough to 
live on well.283 
That figure—$1000 per month—corresponds pretty nicely to 
the official poverty line for a single adult.284 And so, at the very 
least the official federal measure of subsistence and the dominant 
proposed size of a UBI are consistent with each other.285 
Setting the magnitude of the UBI at a level to eliminate 
poverty assumes that elimination of poverty is a central goal of the 
program.286 There is no consensus in the United States that 
redistributive policies on this level are a legitimate function of 
                                                                                                     
idle—automatically receives from the government”). 
 282. See Heller, supra note 3, at 66 (explaining that there is a mixed reaction 
to the UBI, but its supporters generally propose a figure that is “enough to live 
on—somewhere in America, at least—but not nearly enough to live on well”). 
 283. Heller, supra note 3, at 66. 
 284. See 2019 POVERTY GUIDELINES, supra note 70 (stating that the “poverty 
guideline” (sometimes called the “federal poverty level”) for a single adult in 2019 
is $12,490 per year. For a family of four, the poverty guideline is $25,750). 
 285. The way the Poverty Guideline is calculated in the United States has 
been widely criticized, with many critics arguing that it is out-of-date and 
dramatically underestimates the amount of income necessary to avoid poverty. 
See NICHOLAS EBERSTADT, THE POVERTY OF ‘THE POVERTY RATE’ (AEI Press 2008) 
(arguing that the official poverty rate underestimates the amount of income 
necessary to avoid poverty). 
 286. See About Basic Income, supra note 82 (noting that a basic income that, 
in conjunction with other social services, is high enough “to eliminate material 
poverty and enable the social and cultural participation of every individual” is 
called a “full Basic Income”).  
140 26 WASH. & LEE J. CIV. RTS. & SOC. JUST. 85 (2019) 
government.287 That is at least one reason why some UBI proposals 
are more modest and do not propose a UBI that would permit an 
adult to survive even on a subsistence level.288 But even Charles 
Murray proposes a UBI of $13,000 per year (with $3000 of it 
mandatorily earmarked to purchase catastrophic health 
insurance).289 He argues that he would prefer a government 
without any redistributive policies to help the poor, disabled, or 
elderly at all, but that libertarian ideal is “a solution that upward 
of 90% of the population will dismiss.”290 Therefore, he proposes a 
UBI at a level that “lowers the rate of involuntary poverty to zero 
for everyone who has any capacity to work or any capacity to get 
along with other people—which means just about everybody.”291 
Of course, thinking about how big an EITC would have to be 
to eradicate poverty is a complicated issue, because an EITC 
provides no income to anyone without earnings from the market 
economy. As a definitional matter, an EITC recipient has at least 
some market earnings. So, how much market earnings does one 
assume when one is claiming that the EITC is set to eradicate 
poverty? Surely, it should be large enough to bring any person who 
works at least 2000 hours at the federal minimum wage out of 
poverty. That seems like the most parsimonious way of 
interpreting the mandate. A person who works 2000 hours at the 
                                                                                                     
 287. See Amanda Novello, Universal Basic Income versus Jobs Guarantee—
Which Serves Workers Better?, THE CENTURY FOUNDATION, 
https://tcf.org/content/commentary/universal-basic-income-versus-jobs-guarante
e-serves-workers-better/?agreed=1 (last visited Oct. 23, 2019) (explaining that 
there is controversy over the role of the government in implementing such a 
redistributive program) [https://perma.cc/9SQ3-29X4]. 
 288. See Thomas Straubhaar, On the Economics of a Universal Basic Income, 
INTERECONOMICS, https://archive.intereconomics.eu/year/2017/2/on-the-
economics-of-a-universal-basic-income/ (last visited Oct. 23, 2019) (explaining 
that the subsistence level is a political and not economic determination) 
[https://perma.cc/49NF-6MEY]. 
 289. See MURRAY, supra note 177, at 3 (proposing that “we should take all of 
[money spent on income transfers] and give it back to the American people in cash 
grants”). 
 290. See MURRAY, supra note 177, at 7 (proposing that the UBI should be 
$13,000 per year for each person over 21, with at least $3000 of that required to 
be spent on catastrophic health insurance). Murray believes that the UBI should 
be accompanied by a constitutional amendment that requires the repeal of all 
other social spending in order to ensure that redistributive spending does not 
increase too much. 
 291. MURRAY, supra note 177, at 37. 
EITC FOR ALL 141 
federal minimum wage of $7.25 earns $14,500, which is already 
more than the federal poverty guideline for a one-person 
household.292 That would suggest that if one’s goal was only 
eradicating poverty for full-time workers, an EITC would only be 
required for households with children. That is basically the 
structure of the current EITC, although it still fails to bring all 
households headed by a full-time worker out of poverty.293 
But, presumably, one’s goal for a UBI would be more 
expansive. For simplicity’s sake, let’s imagine a reformed EITC 
whose goal was to bring all households headed by at least a 
half-time worker out of poverty. A worker who worked 1000 hours 
at federal minimum wage would earn $7250. If that worker lived 
alone, he or she would need $5240 of EITC to reach the federal 
poverty guideline for single-person households. That seems like a 
reasonable place to start if one were proposing expanding the EITC 
to bring it closer to reaching the goal of eradicating involuntary 
poverty. For a worker to qualify for $5240 of credit with the first 
$7250 of income, the “phase-in rate” would have to be at least 73%, 
so for every dollar earned up to $7250, a worker receives 
seventy-three cents of EITC. When the worker earned $7250, they 
have received the maximum credit of $5293, which brings them 
(barely) over the federal poverty guideline of $12,490.294  
This discussion leaves out the correct level for a household 
with children. If we assume that our goal is to bring a household 
out of poverty when one adult worker works at least 1000 hours at 
minimum wage, then we need to set the credit for each child at an 
appropriate level. The federal poverty guidelines go up by $4420 
                                                                                                     
 292. See 2019 POVERTY GUIDELINES, supra note 70 (showing that the poverty 
guideline for a single person household is $12,490). 
 293. Margot L. Crandall-Hollick, The Earned Income Tax Credit:  An 
Economic Analysis, CONG. RES. SERV. 1, 14 (2018), 
https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R44057.pdf (observing that married and unmarried 
childless workers with pre-tax income below the poverty line have their income 
remain under the poverty line even after adding the EITC) 
[https://perma.cc/JYU9-CNMW]. 
 294. I personally prefer an EITC set at 100% of earnings up to $6000, so a 
person earning $6000 would receive an EITC benefit of $6000 a year, or $500 a 
month. Chris Hughes proposes a benefit of $500 a month, which he argues should 
be provided through an “expanded and modernized EITC.” HUGHES, supra note 
44, at 167. 
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for each additional member of a household after the first.295 
Therefore, the child maximum credit must be at least $4420 if the 
adult maximum credit is $5293.296 So, an adult worker, for each 
child they have, would get an additional credit of sixty-one cents 
for every dollar earned. An adult with custody of one child would 
get $1.34 for every dollar earned up to $7250; an adult with custody 
of two children would get $1.95 for every dollar earned up to $7250; 
etc. Of course, the program could move the child benefit out of the 
EITC so earning was irrelevant—into a child tax credit, for 
example, that every parent gets no matter how much they earn.297 
Similarly, if the adult credit were increased, the child credit could 
be decreased slightly, but that might result in very large families 
still falling below the federal poverty line. Perhaps it would make 
sense to provide levels that brings any family with three or fewer 
children above the poverty line, and not worry about ensuring that 
every single family with one parent working 1000 hours still 
exceeds the poverty line.298 
Finally, it is important to acknowledge that an EITC (unlike 
some conceptions of a UBI) could never replace most other 
conditional transfer programs. Anyone who is unable to work in 
the market economy cannot benefit from the EITC, and so unless 
the government is to forsake them completely, other programs 
must still exist. For example, the various programs under the 
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 297. See Gil Charney, The New Child Tax Credit, H & R BLOCK (Oct. 10, 2018), 
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child tax credit without a work requirement. In order for a one-child household to 
avoid poverty, the per-child benefit would have to be $3660, so a person with 
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$6000 so long as they earn at least $6000. If they work 1,000 hours at $7.25, they 
have $7250 of market income, $6000 of individual benefit and $3660 of child tax 
credit, for a total of $16,910 (exactly the federal poverty guideline of $16,910 for 
a family of two). Unfortunately, this benefit structure would not be enough to 
ensure that a single parent of two or more children had income above the poverty 
guideline. 
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purview of the Social Security Administration:  Programs for the 
disabled,299 elderly,300 and others would still need to continue, since 
those people cannot work in the market economy. Similarly, it 
would probably be necessary to continue SNAP301 and TANF,302 
since it is inappropriate to cease to provide any support for families 
with children who are unable to find work despite diligent effort.303 
These programs might be able to be reduced if the EITC was 
expanded but could not be completely abandoned. 
Like the three other EITC reform proposals made in this 
Article—to remove the phase-out, to remove the family-status 
provisions, and to pay the benefit monthly—this proposal to 
expand the EITC so it almost eradicates poverty in all workers able 
to work at least 1000 hours per year is not a necessary component 
of any reform effort.304 The EITC would be improved if any one of 
the reform proposals was enacted without the others, and none is 
necessary for its improvement. It is only if the goal of EITC reform 
is to get closer to eradicating poverty that its expansion is 
necessary. But that is a worthy goal. 
                                                                                                     
 299. See Disability—How You Qualify, SOC. SECURITY ADMIN. 
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VI. Conclusion 
A universal basic income is in many ways a radical idea, and 
there are many reasonable people who are, and are likely to 
remain, unconvinced of the net benefits of such a significant 
overhaul of government transfer programs. That being said, 
proponents of a UBI are not wrong that many of a UBI’s 
components are good policy. There are benefits to providing 
transfers in cash (or the equivalent on a debit card), to minimizing 
complicated and hard-to-verify qualifications for participation, to 
reducing or eliminating the “marginal tax rate” caused by the 
(too-steep) phase-out of benefits, to making each adult individually 
qualified rather than qualifications depending on family (and 
especially marital) status, and to providing the transfers regularly 
throughout the year when struggling people need them most. 
There are also benefits that may accrue from delinking 
anti-poverty transfers from paid work or attempts to get employed, 
although there are perceived (and possibly real) detriments to such 
an approach as well. This Article has attempted to provide a more 
modest way forward than trying to implement a true UBI all at 
once. Instead, it has proposed a series of reforms of the Earned 
Income Tax Credit, each of which makes the EITC more 
“UBI-like.” Completely avoiding the discussion at the heart of a 
UBI—the delinking of transfers from labor—this Article has 
proposed that the EITC could be (i) paid to all without a phase-out, 
(ii) paid individually rather than based on family status, (iii) 
delivered monthly rather than annually, and (iv) expanded so it is 
large enough to eradicate poverty for any worker who can work at 
least half time at a job that pays at least the federal minimum 
wage. These reforms would still leave many poor people out:  The 
disabled, elderly, full-time unpaid caregivers, and anyone else 
unable to secure employment for at least half the year would still 
be without assistance, and so the programs that serve those people 
would need to continue to operate. But for the rest of us, an 
expanded reformed EITC could provide a universal safety net that 
could capture many of the benefits of a UBI without the need to 
invent a bold new system seemingly out of nothing. It is plausible 
that modest half steps are less politically realistic than 
revolutionary action. But it is surely worthwhile to consider the 
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possibility that benefits can be achieved without the radically new, 
even one modest step at a time. 
